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IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 
Shalini Bhargava Ray*
Despite deportation’s devastating efects, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) specifies deportation as the penalty for nearly every 
immigration law violation. Critics have regularly decried the INA’s lack 
of proportionality, contending that the penalty often does not fit the of-
fense. The immigration bureaucracy’s implementation of the INA, how-
ever, involves a spectrum of penalties short of deportation. Using tools 
such as administrative closure, orders of supervision, and deferred ac-
tion, agency bureaucrats decide who is deported and who stays, and on 
what terms, on a purely ad hoc basis. In this “shadow system,” immi-
grants, their advocates, and the broader public lack basic information 
about what penalties are being imposed and why.
This Article argues for reframing the problem of immigration law’s
disproportionality as a problem of insufcient justification—one remedi-
able only by building the infrastructure for reason giving in the immigra-
tion bureaucracy. Deportation strikes many as disproportionate because
the government often lacks satisfactory reasons for imposing such a dras-
tic penalty. But in the system of shadow sanctions today, the government
not only fails to ofer good reasons: It fails to ofer any at all. As a result,
the system of shadow sanctions represents a classic case of an arbitrary 
exercise of government power. Looking to examples of procedural innova-
tion across the administrative state, this Article backs prudential reforms 
to create immigration law’s missing reason-giving infrastructure. With
it in place, the public can demand better reasons or proportionality. But 
the first step is addressing immigration law’s arbitrariness problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the nineteenth century, judges have recognized deportation as
a penalty “beyond all reason in its severity.”1 In Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, the Chinese immigrant plaintifs allegedly failed to obtain certifi-
cates of residence required for lawful presence under section 6 of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892, rendering them deportable.2 Justice 
Stephen Johnson Field argued in dissent that “neglect to obtain a certifi-
cate of residence” hardly warranted forced expulsion without indictment
and trial.3 Such a punishment involves removal from one’s place of resi-
dence and the “breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and 
business there contracted.”4 
1. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
One of the plaintifs failed to obtain the certificate of residence because he could not pre-
sent the requisite “white witness” to vouch for his lawful presence. Id. at 729–31.
2. Id. at 725–26.
3. Id. at 758–59.









                                                                                                                           
 
    
 
 






















2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2051 
Like Justice Field, immigration law scholars have long bemoaned the
cruelty of “the deportation state,”5 focusing specifically on immigration
law’s overreliance on deportation and the resulting disproportionality in 
many cases.6 The black letter law of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) specifies deportation as the sanction for nearly all transgressions of
immigration law, no matter how minor, and regardless of the personal cir-
cumstances of the immigrant.7 In failing to recognize that deportation
lacks adequate justification in many cases, the criticism goes, immigration 
law contemplates life sentences for the proverbial parking violation.8 Crit-
ics have often pressed analogies to criminal law, arguing that some deport-
able immigrants warrant penalties short of deportation:9 Just as those 
5. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration 
Law 79 (2020) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law]. 
6. See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional
Deportation, 62 Emory L.J. 1243, 1298 (2013) [hereinafter Banks, Cases for Proportional
Deportation] (arguing that immigration law disproportionately sanctions longer-term per-
manent residents with minor convictions); Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84
Fordham L. Rev. 661, 665 (2015) [hereinafter Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity] (argu-
ing that “[t]he removal system . . . imposes dire penalties on the basis of a broad range of
civil infractions”); Jill E. Family, The Future Relief of Immigration Law, 9 Drexel L. Rev. 393, 
406 (2017) (arguing for adopting the European Convention of Human Rights’ proportion-
ality analysis in immigration); Laila Hlass, The Adultification of Immigrant Children, 34 
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 199, 256 (2020) (noting the need for a system of graduated sanctions in 
immigration law, especially to distinguish between child migrants and adults); Daniel
Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring Proportionality, and 
Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 30 J.L. & Pol. 465, 466 (2015) [hereinafter Kanstroom,
Smart(er) Enforcement] (arguing for “tak[ing] the notions of proportionality and gradu-
ated sanctions seriously in structural—rather than in discretionary—ways”); Juliet Stumpf,
Fitting Punishment, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1683, 1684 (2009) (noting that, in immigration 
law, “[n]either the gravity of the violation nor the harm that results governs whether depor-
tation is the consequence for an immigration violation”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration 
Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 415, 416 (2012) (noting
widespread public perception of immigration law as “too harsh”).
7. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2018) (listing a violation of nonimmigrant sta-
tus or a condition of admission, such as overstaying a visa, as a deportable ofense). The INA 
contains waivers from inadmissibility and removability that can soften the application of 
deportation, but they are not systematic, and little data is available on how frequently they 
are granted. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in Immigration Cases, 72
Admin. L. Rev. 367, 402 n.164 (2020); see also U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Number
of Service-Wide Forms by Fiscal Year To-Date, Quarter, and Form Status 2019, https:// 
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/Quarterly_All_Forms_FY19Q1.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/G3LQ-4NSD] (last visited July 26, 2021).
8. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) (“This is not to say that a 
proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example . . . if a legisla-
ture made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”). 
9. See Banks, Cases for Proportional Deportation, supra note 6, at 1266–78 (compar-
ing criminal law to immigration law); Stumpf, supra note 6, at 1720–40 (using criminal law
as a model for proportionality and discussing alternative sanctions such as fines and delayed
access to immigration benefits); see also Wishnie, supra note 6, at 418–24 (describing juris-
prudence of proportionality in criminal law).
 
   
 
 




























2052 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:2049 
convicted of crimes must receive proportionate sentences in some cases
under the Eighth Amendment, deportation is unwarranted in at least
some immigration cases.10 
Although criminal procedure ofers a model for protecting targets of
enforcement from civil liberties violations,11 analogies to criminal law have 
foundered conceptually and in the courts. Conceptually, criminal law does 
not ofer a compelling example of proportionality.12 Legislatures retain
vast discretion to punish felonies with lengthy terms of imprisonment, and 
proportionality in criminal law has limited traction outside of capital pun-
ishment and life sentences without parole.13 As the jurisprudence stands
today, the Eighth Amendment ofers a weak, inadequate check on dispro-
portionate punishment, underscored by rampant overpunishment and 
overcriminalization.14 
Federal courts have also roundly rejected eforts to apply constitu-
tional proportionality doctrines to removal orders. Courts have specifically 
rejected application of the Eighth Amendment to removal orders, instead
afrming immigration law’s “civil” rather than “criminal” character,15 not-
withstanding recognition of the overlap.16 Courts have similarly rejected 
10. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299–300 (1983) (reviewing life sentence without 
parole for proportionality). But see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 (recognizing that there is legis-
lative prerogative when imposing felony sentences). 
11. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law Is Torn Between Administrative Law and 
Criminal Law, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.
com/nc/immigration-law-is-torn-between-administrative-law-and-criminal-law-by-michael-
kagan/ [https://perma.cc/TYN6-C82V] (“Criminal procedure ofers tools that are espe-
cially well suited to address the urgent civil liberties concerns in immigration law, especially
the manner in which [DHS] arrests and detains people on immigration allegations.”). 
12. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 883 
(2005) (arguing that federal criminal law lacks fidelity to the principle of proportionality,
largely because federal judges have construed federal crimes expansively, increasing the 
number of potential defendants). 
13. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (rejecting the notion that the 
Eighth Amendment contains a “proportionality guarantee”); see also Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 681 (2005) (charac-
terizing the Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence in criminal law as “highly un-
satisfactory and disappointing; the body of law is messy and complex, yet largely meaningless
as a constraint, except perhaps in a few instances in the capital context”).
14. See Excessive Punishment, Equal Just. Initiative, https://eji.org/issues/excessive-
punishment/ [https://perma.cc/RAE6-ENJ2] (last visited July 26, 2021) (describing “dec-
ades of harsh and extreme sentencing”); see also Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1317– 
19 (2021) (holding that, for juveniles who commit homicide, the Eighth Amendment does 
not require a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility to sentence someone to life in 
prison without parole).
15. See, e.g., Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting “removal’s civil
character”). 
16. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (noting that “deportation is 
nevertheless inherently related to the criminal process”); see also Daniel Kanstroom,








    
  

















   
   
  




2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2053 
applying the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause’s proportionality rule 
for punitive damages to removal orders.17 At the end of the day, eforts to
apply constitutional proportionality doctrines in immigration law have 
reached a dead end.18 
This Article takes a diferent approach to the INA’s failure to mean-
ingfully distinguish among deportable immigrants. Rather than pressing
constitutional proportionality doctrines or analogies to criminal law, it 
looks inward to the apparatus of the immigration bureaucracy by examin-
ing the many informal, discretionary tools that bureaucrats use to show 
lenience. These tools include deferred action, administrative closure, and
orders of supervision, all of which defer the issuance or execution of a
removal order, sometimes indefinitely.19 These tools comprise a system of
shadow sanctions,20 one that remains largely unregulated and hidden from 
public view.21 Most noncitizens likely lack any knowledge of what these
shadow sanctions are, how to apply for them, or the standards by which 
Deportation Nation] (discussing the Supreme Court’s “bright-line” between detention in-
cident to removal and “infamous punishment” in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896)).
17. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (noting that “[t]he Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly 
excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor” (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443, 454 (1993))); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: 
The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085, 1123 (2006) (cri-
tiquing BMW v. Gore’s “guideposts” for evaluating punitive damages awards). Because immi-
gration law is federal law, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies, but courts
and scholars have presumed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
standards are equivalent. See, e.g., Hinds, 790 F.3d at 268 n.8 (treating claims under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments equivalently); Angela M. Banks, 
Proportional Deportation, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1651, 1655 (2009) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment ensures proportionality “in the civil context” and citing Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process cases).
 18. See, e.g., Hinds, 790 F.3d at 263 (explaining that “federal courts have long de-
scribed removal orders as non-punitive and, therefore, not punishment”). 
19. See infra section II.B.
20. One might view forms of lenience as “benefits” rather than “sanctions,” but they 
have elements of both. Although some shadow sanctions come with work authorization and 
other protections, immigrants pay a price for coming out of the shadows and onto the gov-
ernment’s radar. See Asad L. Asad, On the Radar: System Embeddedness and Latin
American Immigrants’ Perceived Risk of Deportation, 54 Law & Soc’y Rev. 133, 135 (2020) 
(arguing that immigrants view “documents” as enhancing their visibility to immigration en-
forcement, fueling the government’s power to “surveil and expel” them). Accordingly, this
Article characterizes these tools of lenience as “shadow sanctions.” 
21. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 181, 184 (2017) (discussing how, in fiscal year 2013, “approximately 83% of all
formal removal orders took place through either reinstatement of prior removal orders or
expedited removal of individuals seeking admission at the border”—summary proceedings 
outside of immigration court). Koh further argues that longstanding critiques applicable to
standard removal proceedings in immigration courts “are far more pronounced, and far 
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the government imposes them.22 Public data about the use of these tools
are also limited, save for occasional Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests.23 As evidenced by this lack of openness and consistency—key val-
ues traditionally associated with the law—the system of shadow sanctions
sufers from serious rule of law deficits.24 Rather than requiring bureau-
crats to make reasoned, consistent, and nonarbitrary judgments when dis-
tinguishing among deportable immigrants,25 the system of shadow 
sanctions creates a zone of unregulated agency discretion.26 
Structuring, constraining, and checking agency discretion is a core
project of administrative law.27 This Article argues for putting administra-
tive law’s doctrinal and conceptual resources to use in mitigating the flaws
of the shadow system. Looking to agency practices in other areas of regu-
lation as well as the example of the European Union, this Article argues
for specific prudential reforms to promote reasoned immigration 
administration. 
Reasoned administration serves as a necessary foundation for, but 
does not equal, proportionality.28 As discussed below, there are many con-
ceptions of proportionality. The immigration law literature has generally 
taken proportionality to mean that the severity of a penalty should track 
the severity of the ofense and should consider noncitizens’ particular cir-
cumstances, such as their length of residence in the United States. This
Article argues for sanctions better tailored to these considerations and
highlights the role of reason giving in attaining this objective. 
22. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization and 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 Colum. J. Race & L. 1, 5 (2016) [hereinaf-
ter Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization] (noting that there is no form or 
other information available about deferred action, other than for the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program). For discussion of DACA, see infra section II.B.1.)
23. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Aftermath of United States v. Texas: 
Rediscovering Deferred Action, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & Comment (Aug. 10, 2016), https:
//www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-aftermath-of-united-states-v-texas-rediscovering-deferred-action-
by-shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia/ [https://perma.cc/UQ9T-LR86] [hereinafter Wadhia, The
Aftermath of United States v. Texas] (discussing the results of a FOIA request on USCIS grants
of deferred action by a field ofce).
24. See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1239, 1258 (2017) (describing “values traditionally associated with the rule of law— 
specifically the values of authorization, notice, justification, coherence, and procedural 
fairness”).
25. Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55 (2011) (applying administrative law’s 
requirement that agency action be based on nonarbitrary factors relevant to immigration 
policy). 
26. See infra section II.C.
27. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 25–26 (1971).
28. See infra section I.B.
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I. PROPORTIONALITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW
American law includes many different conceptions of proportionality.29 
With respect to penalties, proportionality often refers to the notion that pen-
alties should track the gravity of the offense,30 but immigration law does not
follow this principle. Black letter immigration law imposes deportation 
freely, rendering millions of immigrants deportable.31 As of 2017, the un-
documented population hovers around eleven million immigrants,32 and
some additional number of lawful permanent residents are deportable
based on violating what Daniel Kanstroom calls “post-entry social control
laws.”33 Accordingly, scholars have regularly decried the lack of proportion-
ality—that is, the INA’s imposition of a drastic sanction without regard to
meaningful distinctions among deportable immigrants.34 But those argu-
ments have lost traction in recent years, as legislative reform remains elusive35 
and both immigration and federal courts decline to use proportionality to
limit or quash deportation orders.36 Entry without inspection,37 overstaying
29. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Richard S. Frase, Proportionality Principles in American 
Law: Controlling Excessive Government Actions 6 (2008) (identifying “the many forms that
proportionality standards have taken”).
30. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 Crime & 
Just. 55, 56 (1992) (describing the principle of proportionality as embodying the view that 
“punishments scaled to the gravity of ofenses are fairer than punishments that are not”). 
Proportionality also taps into intuitive beliefs about efciency and fairness. Cf. George 
Letsas, Proportionality as Fittingness: The Moral Dimension of Proportionality, 71 Current 
Legal Probs. 53, 71 (2018) (“According to proportionality as fittingness, every judgment 
about the proportionality between harms and goods is ultimately a judgment about the so-
cial role of the acting agent.”). 
31. “Deportable” refers to noncitizens present in the country in violation of the inad-
missibility provisions of section 212 of the INA as well as the removability provisions of
section 237. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1182 (2018).
32. Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Aug. 20,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/WH6K-WQKN]. 
33. See Kanstroom, Deportation Nation, supra note 16, at 124–25. Under these provi-
sions, noncitizens are deportable for crimes committed after entering the United States. Id. 
at 133. The Pew study states that 12.3 million lawful permanent residents reside in the
United States, but it declines to speculate as to how many are currently deportable by
postentry social control laws. See Budiman, supra note 32. 
34. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 6, at 1684 (noting the ubiquity of deportation as the
sanction for any immigration violation).
35. Hannah Miao, Biden’s Immigration Bill Faces an Uphill Battle in Congress, but 
These Parts Could Find Bipartisan Support, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2021/02/27/immigration-biden-bill-faces-uphill-battle-but-these-measures-could-pass.html 
[https://perma.cc/67RT-T5FM] (noting a comprehensive reform bill would be unlikely to
garner support from ten Republican Senators to defeat a filibuster). 
36. See, e.g., Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 262–63, 266 (1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting the
application of constitutional proportionality review to removal orders and afrming the im-
migration judge’s decision to refuse a constitutional challenge to removal orders). 
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2018).
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a visa,38 committing any of a long list of crimes,39 failing to report a change
of address,40 falsifying documents,41 and engaging in terrorism42 all render
a noncitizen deportable, as does becoming a public charge43 and voting
unlawfully.44 Under a strict reading of the INA, most immigration law vio-
lations make a noncitizen deportable, and the INA fails to draw any sys-
tematic distinctions among removable immigrants.45 
Analysis of penalties in U.S. immigration law would benefit from a 
broader view of proportionality, one that focuses on the basic notion of con-
trolling excessive government action.46 This reframing creates an opportunity
to learn from other legal systems. Proportionality outside of the United States
frequently refers to a multistep process for justifying government action.47 As 
understood increasingly around the world, it serves to rein in government
excess by requiring adequate justification for government action.48 More
38. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(C). 
39. See id. § 1227(a)(2). 
40. Id. § 1227(a)(3)(A). 
41. Id. § 1227(a)(3)(B). 
42. Id. § 1227(a)(4). 
43. Id. § 1227(a)(5). As revealed by the recent public charge litigation, the immigra-
tion bureaucracy can stretch or contract these grounds as well. See Cook County v. Wolf,
962 F.3d 208, 215–16 (7th Cir. 2020) (describing DHS’s new public charge rule as “a striking
departure from the previous administrative guidance,” which had cabined the definition of
public charge to those immigrants who receive cash assistance, rather than other forms of 
public benefits, or “institutionalization for long-term care at government expense” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on
Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (May 26, 1999))); City & County of San 
Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 981 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2020) (providing
background on the public charge litigation).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6). 
45. See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text. 
46. Sullivan & Frase, supra note 29, at 3 (noting increasing visibility of “tensions be-
tween the need for administrative and penal regulation, the advancement of social welfare,
and individual autonomy” and the common need for reviewing courts “to determine when
a challenged action is excessive” or disproportionate).
47. Jacco Bomhoff, Beyond Proportionality: Thinking Comparatively About Constitutional 
Review and Punitiveness, in Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges 148, 156 (Vicki 
C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2017) (noting separate discourses of multistep proportion-
ality review and substantive outcomes).
48. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification,
59 Am. J. Compar. L. 463, 474 (2011) (describing the “essence of proportionality” as “a
requirement of justification”). Proportionality review as conducted around the world “typi-
cally consists of a four- or five-step order of decisional march.” See Frank I. Michelman,
Proportionality Outside the Courts With Special Reference to Popular and Political
Constitutionalism, in Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges, supra note 47, at 30;
Sullivan & Frase, supra note 29, at 28 (describing Germany’s proportionality review to in-



























   
   
   
2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2057 
severe penalties warrant weightier reasons.49 Poorly justified penalties
cannot be deemed proportionate.50 Existing scholarship on proportionality
in immigration law, however, has largely overlooked the important role of 
reasons and reason giving in proportionality, to the detriment of the cause.51 
A. Critique of the INA’s Crude Penalty Scheme 
As a result of the INA’s failure to meaningfully distinguish among de-
portable immigrants, millions face drastic punishment for a wide range of
ofenses, despite their personal circumstances or functional membership 
in the polity.52 In recent years, immigration policy has showcased the role 
of deportation in separating families,53 and contemporary research has
borne out Justice Field’s assessment of the severe consequences of depor-
tation.54 Deportation imposes material, emotional, and psychological 
hardships on those left behind and potentially endangers deportees them-
selves.55 Some families of deported individuals face poverty, housing inse-
curity, and hunger, in addition to stress and its sequelae.56 Deportees
49. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 
3094, 3098 (2015) (stating that proportionality “embod[ies] the idea that larger harms im-
posed by government should be justified by more weighty reasons and that more severe
transgressions of the law be more harshly sanctioned than less severe ones”).
50. This inquiry into whether a justification satisfies proportionality has a quantitative
and qualitative dimension. Quantitatively, it requires the decisionmaker to have enough in-
formation to understand the question and reach a decision. Qualitatively, it requires analyz-
ing the adequacy of the reasoning and asking whether proportionality is satisfied. I thank 
Johan Rochel for this clarifying point.
51. For relevant scholarship that generally focuses on statutory reform or more robust 
judicial review, see supra note 6. These works do not discuss immigration law’s missing rea-
son-giving infrastructure. 
52. The INA provides for discretionary waivers and highly restricted forms of relief,
but because those are statutorily defined, they are not considered part of the scheme of 
shadow sanctions, the focus of this Article. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(ii) (2018) 
(authorizing the Attorney General to issue a waiver for document fraud as grounds for re-
moval); id. § 1229(b) (authorizing the Attorney General to cancel removal).
53. See Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2319, 2322– 
24 (2019) (characterizing family separation as a principle pervading the U.S. immigration 
system). 
54. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)
(“As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s resi-
dence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and business there
contracted.”). 
55. See Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, New Yorker (Jan. 8,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-
sentence (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (chronicling the creation of a “shadow da-
tabase” of deportees who had been killed or otherwise harmed).
56. Samantha Artiga & Barbara Lyons, Family Consequences of Deportation/Detention:
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themselves may face “kidnapping, torture, rape, and murder” upon return 
to their countries of origin.57 
U.S. immigration law features an ever-widening chasm between statu-
tory mandates and enforcement realities. Despite the severity of deporta-
tion, Congress expanded the grounds for deportation in 1996.58 These
expansions have exacerbated Congress’s initial failure to systematize qual-
itative distinctions among violations or among ofenders, even though im-
migration bureaucrats (and the public) hold intuitive notions of more and 
less serious immigration ofenses,59 as well as the kinds of qualities that 
warrant lenience.60 This has prompted substantial scholarly critique, with 
a particular focus on the destruction of families and lives that results from 
the deportation of long-term residents.61 Although many scholars have 
called for diversifying the types of sanctions imposed for immigration vio-
lations,62 some have simply taken the position that deportation is currently
overused.63 They share a view that immigration law falls short of substan-
tive justice and proportionality by failing to draw meaningful distinctions 
57. Zachary Mueller, American Psychological Association Report: Consequences of
Deportation Are Severe, Sometimes Fatal, Am.’s Voice (Sept. 25, 2018), https://americas 
voice.org/blog/american-psychological-association-deportations/ [https://perma.cc/FY5 
N-RGBT] (citing Soc. for Cmty. Rsch. & Action, Am. Psych. Ass’n, Statement on the Efects
of Deportation and Forced Separation on Immigrants, Their Families, and Communities, 
62 Am. J. Cmty. Psych. 3, 4 (2018)). 
58. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 840 n.114 (2007) (describing the expansion of deportation
grounds in two 1996 laws); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and
the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 99 (1998) (same).
59. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Cases 24 (2017) [hereinafter Wadhia, Beyond Deportation] (de-
scribing the memo of former INS commissioner Doris Meissner, which calls for prosecuto-
rial discretion to best expend the agency’s resources and identify serious ofenders). 
60. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, to All 
Field Of. Dirs., Special Agents in Charge & Chief Couns. 4 (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice 
.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7KX5-SE3Y] [hereinafter Morton Discretion Memo] (identifying factors warranting a
favorable exercise of discretion).
61. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 6, at 430 (noting that deportation can lead to the 
forcible and permanent severing of important ties of family, community, and friendship,
which judges have characterized as a “savage penalty”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting))). 
62. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 6, at 1728–32 (proposing sanctions in addition to or
instead of deportation); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Abolish ICE . . . and Then What?, 129
Yale L.J. Forum 130, 143 (2019) (discussing fines as “the most obvious option” of “scalable
penalties”).
63. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 6, at 429 (noting that deportation of persons who 
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among deportable immigrants.64 This view echoes what is expected under 
widely held notions of justice and fairness.65 
Some scholars have argued for legislative reform, for the amendment 
of the INA to include a broader range of sanctions, or at a minimum, for 
the INA to refrain from imposing deportation on long-term residents.66 In 
the sections that follow, this Article considers the leading scholarly cri-
tiques of immigration law’s lack of proportionality. 
1. Calls for Legislative Reform. — Scholars have called for legislative re-
form to establish a scheme of graduated sanctions for immigration viola-
tions, but such reform faces perpetual practical obstacles. Juliet Stumpf 
argues, “Immigration law eschews proportionality.”67 Unlike criminal law 
and most areas of civil law, immigration law sanctions all violations with a
single consequence—deportation.68 Stumpf observes that the criminaliza-
tion of immigration over the last few decades has created an urgent need 
for a proportional remedial scheme to match.69 Accordingly, Stumpf pre-
sents a model for determining the proportionality of deportation in a given
case and proposes alternative sanctions, such as delayed access to immigra-
tion benefits.70 Stumpf does not regard the discretion of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to withhold deportation as a form of proportion-
ate sanctions because discretion functions simply to turn off or delay a single
sanction—it does not create alternative sanctions, such as fines.71 But
Stumpf’s exclusion of agency discretion to withhold or delay deportation 
renders the analysis of proportionality incomplete. Postponing deportation 
for a long or indefinite period allows deportable immigrants to make life
plans and deepen roots in their countries of residence, potentially changing 
the government’s calculus regarding the relative advantages of deporting 
them.
64. Id. 
65. Cf. von Hirsch, supra note 30, at 56 (“People have a sense that punishments scaled
to the gravity of ofenses are fairer than punishments that are not.”). 
66. See infra section I.A.1.
67. Stumpf, supra note 6, at 1684.
 68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1689 (“Particularly in light of the criminalization of immigration law, the 
need is compelling for immigration law to have a system of graduated sanctions like that in 
criminal law.”).
70. Id. at 1737 (describing alternative sanctions of “restricting or delaying access to
immigration benefits, imposing probation-like conditions or requiring community service,
higher application fees for immigration benefits, or attending remedial courses on citizen-
ship preparedness”). 
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Others have argued for proportionality based on history and legislative 
intent. Angela M. Banks has argued for reclaiming Congress’s historical re-
gard for proportionality in meting out deportations.72 Banks posits that
“[t]he proportionality principle provides a basis for balancing the govern-
ment’s interest in punishment and an individual’s fundamental rights.”73 
The United States began regulating immigrants’ postentry conduct with
the 1917 Immigration Act by making certain convictions grounds for de-
portation.74 In the years leading up to passing this legislation, members of
Congress vigorously debated “which crimes were serious enough to war-
rant deportation.”75 Members of Congress also weighed the efects on fam-
ilies, in terms of both financial hardship and family separation.76 Early
legislation further demonstrated concern for proportionality by empower-
ing criminal trial judges to issue judicial recommendations against depor-
tation (JRADs), thus relying on the judiciary to determine when 
deportation would be disproportionate.77 Banks notes that, as a practical
matter, many criminal trial judges remained unaware of JRADs and issued 
them infrequently.78 But Congress amended the INA in 1952 to provide 
another avenue for balancing the harshness of deportation against an in-
dividual immigrant’s equities. This provision is known as section 212(c) 
relief, which empowered immigration judges (IJs) rather than criminal
trial judges.79 Banks argues that two major laws passed in 1996 eroded this
approach by expanding the grounds for deportation and scaling back re-
lief from removal.80 Yet, Banks believes that deportation should be im-
posed only “when it is a proportionate response to criminal activity.”81 
Anchoring her analysis to jus nexi, or the connection principle, Banks ar-
gues that lawful permanent residents have a liberty interest in remaining
72. See Banks, Cases for Proportional Deportation, supra note 6, at 1246 (noting that 
“the United States’ first comprehensive crime-based deportation regime” used proxies 
other than citizenship to identify members of the national community and that these prox-
ies “can be utilized today through complex rule-like directives”).
73. Id. at 1267.
74. Id. at 1268.
75. Id. at 1270.
76. Id. at 1274 (noting congressional awareness of “financial hardships and family sep-
aration” resulting from deportation).
77. Id. at 1275 (noting members of Congress “had faith in the judiciary to determine
when deportation would be disproportionate”). 
78. Id. at 1276 (“The potential power of JRADs was never realized because judicial 
authority to issue a JRAD was not widely known and was therefore rarely used.”).
79. Id. at 1277–78 (“[IJs] were trusted to balance the severity of the criminal act and
the connections to the United States to decide if deportation was warranted.”). 
80. Id. at 1279–80 (discussing the legislative histories of the Anti-Terrorism and 
Efective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996). 
81. Id. at 1245–46.
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in the United States even after a criminal conviction.82 They should be rec-
ognized as members of the polity due to their genuine connection to it,83 
as measured by length of residence, obligations to the polity, and other 
ties.84 Banks argues that deportation of such polity members violates pro-
portionality.85 Other scholars share these concerns.86 Like Stumpf, Banks
focuses on the formal terms of the INA rather than bureaucratic discre-
tion, and as a result, concludes that meaningful reform would require new
legislation.87 
Kanstroom has argued for foundational reform and a scheme of grad-
uated sanctions to constrain immigration enforcement, advance propor-
tionality, and respect immigrants’ community afliations.88 Such reform 
follows from the notion of meaningful distinctions among deportable im-
migrants and a belief in second chances. Deportation frequently amounts 
to a disproportionate sanction, as it fails to account for the reasonable and 
often sympathetic motives that drive unlawful entry, unlawful presence, or
violation of postentry social controls.89 Rather than leaving the ultimate 
judgment entirely to the IJ’s discretion, however, Kanstroom argues for 
structural reform, such as a statute of limitations on deportation.90 He also 
advocates for a scheme of graduated sanctions allowing for a fit between 
the ofender and the sanction.91 Further, IJs could “partner with existing
social service and probation networks to craft creative alternatives to re-
moval and lifetime banishment.”92 Thus, deportation would not be the 
82. Id. at 1252–57.
83. Id. (describing the connection principle for allocating citizenship). 
84. Id. at 1253–54 (describing these measures of connection to the polity).
85. Id. at 1246 (noting that deporting permanent residents for crimes such as “perjury, 
receipt of stolen property, or failure to appear in court can be excessively harsh”). For a
discussion of the significance of lengthy residence to membership, see Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Outside the Law 110–12 (2014) (describing “immigration as afliation” as the 
view that the longer a noncitizen resides in the United States, and the deeper their commu-
nity and family ties here, the more they should be treated like a citizen). 
86. For additional discussion of proportionality in immigration law, see supra note 6.
87. Banks, Cases for Proportional Deportation, supra note 6, at 1307 (discussing legis-
lation that members of Congress had sponsored to “allow immigrants’ connections to be 
considered when deportation decisions are made” and describing overcoming challenges
to passing such legislation as “necessary”); see also id. at 1303 (describing measures 
Congress could take to promote proportionality). 
88. Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement, supra note 6, at 482, 493 (proposing “an ex-
periment with graduated sanctions in removal cases” and stating that “[p]roportionality is a 
constraint on power that mandates consideration of certain extraneous factors in order to
justify removal”).
 89. Id. 
90. Id. at 488–89; see also Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Deportation Deadline, 95 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 531, 542 (2017) (noting the absence of a statute of limitations in civil immigration 
enforcement proceedings, contrary to most other civil enforcement contexts). 
91. Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement, supra note 6, at 490–92.
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first and only sanction; instead, it would be triggered only after other
measures fell short in deterring new unlawful conduct.93 Such a proposal
would likely require congressional action;94 accordingly, it encounters 
some of the same difculties as other proposals for reform discussed
above. 
In contrast to scholars focusing principally on the formal terms of the 
INA, Jason A. Cade argues for legislative reform as well as administrative 
rulemaking to advance equity and proportionality in immigration law.95 
Cade recognizes qualitative and moral distinctions among deportable im-
migrants but argues that administrations rely excessively on criminal his-
tory as a marker of those most suited for deportation.96 Apart from the 
executive branch’s “criminal history blind spot,” Cade notes that agency 
discretion has limits in advancing equity because it can, at most, preserve 
the status quo by terminating proceedings or deferring deportation.97 It 
does not produce legal status or “durable relief.”98 Accordingly, Cade views 
agency discretion as ofering a potential avenue to promote equity and 
proportionality, but a highly limited one. Cade ultimately calls for legisla-
tive reform and better agency guidance regarding noncitizens with crimi-
nal arrests or convictions.99 Cade takes an important step in recognizing
the potential for administrative discretion to advance proportionality but 
focuses on a subset of deportable noncitizens, namely those with criminal 
convictions. 
2. Calls for a Robust Role for the Judiciary. — Other scholars have ar-
gued for limiting the imposition of deportation by recognizing the judici-
ary’s role in applying constitutional proportionality doctrines. Michael J.
Wishnie has argued that noncitizens have a substantive due process right 
against disproportionate sanctions, including deportation, based on the 
Fifth Amendment and, in some cases, the Eighth Amendment.100 Wishnie 
further identifies two strands of proportionality review in Supreme Court
93. Id. 
94. See id. at 493 (proposing “a substantial revision of the aggravated felony category” 
in the INA, a statute of limitations, and “more creative thinking about both the structural 
components and mechanisms of deportation law”). 
95. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 6, at 668–69 (echoing calls for
amending the INA but also recognizing the unlikelihood of achieving such reform, and thus 
also ofering practical measures for the executive to undertake). 
96. Id. at 668 (noting the Obama Administration’s “extremely broad” view of criminal
history, including migration crimes, trafc ofenses, and misdemeanors, and its use of such
criminal history as a proxy for a noncitizen’s undesirability). 
97. Id. at 712.
98. Id. at 711 (quoting Margaret H. Taylor, What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation?
Rationalizing Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief From Removal, 30 J.L.
& Pol. 527, 532 (2015)).
99. Id. at 720–23 (advancing an argument focused on the treatment of immigrants 
with criminal convictions but not arguing for overhauling executive branch discretion).
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jurisprudence: case-by-case analysis and categorical analysis.101 Under case-
by-case review, the court reviews the punishment for “gross disproportion-
ality.”102 Wishnie notes that courts overturn very few sentences under this 
analysis because courts seldom conclude that a sentence “is so excessive in
relation to the ofense to create an inference of gross disproportional-
ity.”103 But under categorical analysis, the court evaluates the proportion-
ality of “an entire class of criminal punishment for a particular ofense . . . 
or for a particular population.”104 He advocates for proportionality review 
of removal orders, both case-by-case and categorical, by courts and IJs.105 
Although the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal punish-
ment, and the Supreme Court has continually characterized deportation 
as a “civil” sanction, Wishnie notes that immigration has become “quasi-
criminal.”106 Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky
recognized deportation as “an integral part” of the penalty for specific 
crimes.107 In addition to the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause ofers textual support for proportionality review, which
the Supreme Court has interpreted to require proportionality in punitive 
damages.108 On these grounds, and given deportation’s punitive nature,
Wishnie argues that removal orders should comply with the proportional-
ity principle.109 He further notes that, under the current statutory scheme,
the IJ would be the proper actor for gauging the proportionality of re-
moval for a given noncitizen.110 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, however, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and IJs have generally concluded that IJs lack
jurisdiction to review removal orders for proportionality.111 The governing 
101. Id. at 419–20.
102. Id. at 420.
 103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 424.
106. Id. at 426.
107. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010); see also Wishnie, supra note 6, at 424, 
428, 447.
108. Wishnie, supra note 6, at 423. Because immigration law is federal law, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies, but courts and scholars have presumed that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause standards are equivalent. See supra 
note 17; see also, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions
of [undocumented immigrants] within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons 
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
109. Wishnie, supra note 6, at 423–24.
110. Id. at 418, 444.
111. See, e.g., In re Sunday, 2015 WL 799738, at *1 (B.I.A. Jan. 2, 2015) (afrming the 
IJ’s determination that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) does not authorize proportionality review 
of removal order); see also In re Brito, 2016 WL 8468279, at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 8, 2016) (noting
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provision of the INA states: “At the conclusion of the proceeding the [IJ] 
shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States. The 
determination of the [IJ] shall be based only on the evidence produced at 
the hearing.”112 Although Wishnie argues that courts should rely on the 
canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute to incorporate a
proportionality requirement,113 IJs and the BIA generally have either re-
jected the argument114 or declined to reach the question of whether the 
INA authorizes, let alone requires, proportionality review.115 
The INA preserves judicial review, however, for “constitutional claims 
or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appro-
priate court of appeals in accordance with this section,”116 and advocates 
have pressed for proportionality review in the federal courts based on this 
provision and the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.117 In
Padilla, the Supreme Court held that competent criminal defense counsel 
must advise noncitizen clients about the immigration consequences of a 
criminal plea.118 Padilla further recognized deportation as “an integral
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that 
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.”119 Scholars and advocates argued that the Court had recognized
crime-based deportation as a “quasi-criminal” sanction susceptible to pro-
portionality review.120 
Federal courts, however, have rejected this reasoning so far. The First
Circuit rejected the notion that Padilla transformed crime-based deporta-
tion into a punishment susceptible to Eighth Amendment analysis, citing 
the longstanding view of deportation as a nonpunitive sanction.121 It spe-
cifically noted the “illogic[]” of conducting case-by-case proportionality
review for noncitizens removed on criminal grounds but not for those re-
moved on other grounds.122 Similarly, the Second Circuit denied due pro-
cess proportionality review to a noncitizen ordered removed for having
Act requires a proportionality review before an order of removal can be entered”); In re 
Castro-Cambisaca, 2016 WL 1357987, at *2 (B.I.A. Mar. 11, 2016) (concluding that the stat-
ute does not require an IJ to conduct a proportionality review for a removal order). 
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(a) (2018). 
113. Wishnie, supra note 6, at 442–45.
114. See supra note 111.
 115. See, e.g., Brito, 2016 WL 8468279, at *1.
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
117. 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that counsel must inform clients, regardless of
citizenship, whether their pleas carry the risk of deportation).
118. Id. at 373–74 (“The severity of deportation . . . only underscores how critical it is 
for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”).
119. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted). 
120. See Wishnie, supra note 6, at 417, 426.
121. See, e.g., Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 263–66 (1st Cir. 2015).
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entered without inspection.123 Petitioner had argued that deportation was
disproportionate to his removal ground, thereby violating due process.124 
The court ruled that the Constitution requires proportionality review of 
punitive civil sanctions out of a concern for fairness and notice but that
the penalty of deportation for entry without inspection was “neither novel 
nor unexpected.”125 As a result, petitioner’s case did not present the con-
siderations driving due process proportionality review of civil sanctions. 
The arguments for proportionality in immigration law to date advance a 
powerful normative claim about the equity, fundamental fairness, and sub-
stantive justice due to immigrants and their families,126 but as a practical
matter, many of these arguments have lost traction. Federal courts have 
rejected them, and legislative reform remains elusive.127 In recent years,
federal courts have evinced minimal concern for deportable immigrants’ 
constitutional rights.128 As a result, proponents of proportionality must 
grapple with the limited avenues remaining beyond analogies to criminal 
law and constitutional proportionality doctrines. 
B. Proportionality as a Structural Value 
Proportionality describes a relationship between a penalty and an of-
fense, but it also has an important procedural or structural dimension.
Scholars have identified proportionality as a fundamental value in the law,
relevant to the analyses of both rules and sanctions.129 According to Moshe
Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, proportionality originated in Prussian admin-
istrative law and quickly spread to German constitutional law and the
European Court of Human Rights.130 As a precept of justice, it stands for 
the notion that greater harms should be justified by “more weighty rea-
sons,” and that “more severe transgressions of the law be more harshly 
sanctioned than less severe ones.”131 Vicki C. Jackson has argued that pro-
portionality has a long history in Anglo-American law, as well as a special 
123. Marin-Marin v. Sessions, 852 F.3d 192, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2017).
124. Id. at 194.
 125. Id. 
126. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 6, at 429 (noting the painful destruction of family
ties that removal often causes). 
127. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
128. See Shalini Bhargava Ray, The Emerging Lessons of Trump v. Hawaii, 29 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 775, 806 (2021) [hereinafter Ray, Trump v. Hawaii] (noting that recent cases 
regard immigrants as “weak rights-holders” with respect to the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and the First Amendment). 
129. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 49, at 3108 (“[T]he goal of proportionality is implicit 
in any constitution that aims to produce justice by limiting as well as empowering 
government.”).
130. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 48, at 465.


































2066 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:2049 
role in a constitutional democracy.132 Specifically, the constitutional pro-
portionality doctrines in U.S. jurisprudence ofer “some limit on otherwise 
authorized government action, a limit connected to a sense of fairness to 
individuals or a desire to prevent government abuse of power.”133 Cohen-
Eliya and Porat conclude that global trends toward proportionality follow
from the “culture of justification,” or the requirement that governments
justify their actions.134 On this view, proportionality depends on reasons. 
Reason giving ofers a tool to mitigate the problem of a lack of fit 
between penalty and ofense in immigration law.135 In the immigration law
literature, scholars regard deportation as disproportionate based on the 
noncitizen’s circumstances and personal qualities, such as their family and 
community ties, and not simply the INA ground that the noncitizen vio-
lated.136 Requiring the government to consider these specific facts and ex-
plain how deportation serves to achieve its ends would promote a more
nuanced scheme of sanctions. To reach a well-reasoned decision, however,
the government must have enough information before it, and it must en-
gage in analysis and deliberation.137 A well-reasoned decision, in turn, re-
quires a minimum set of procedures to elicit evidence and to analyze that 
information.138 
The emphasis on reasons and reason giving resonates with ordinary
U.S. administrative law, specifically through doctrines and structures to 
132. Id. at 3107–08.
133. Id. at 3098.
134. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 48, at 474.
135. For a discussion of diferent conceptions of proportionality in U.S. criminal law,
see Youngjae Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1835, 1840 (2012) (de-
scribing three conceptions of proportionality that the Supreme Court has used in its consti-
tutional jurisprudence, including one that requires courts “to take a particular crime and a 
particular punishment and set them against each other” regardless of how other crimes are
punished). This “matching” conception does not apply cleanly in immigration law, for in
immigration law, judgments about the proportionality of deportation have historically in-
volved a much broader range of considerations, including the “seriousness of the crime and
what impacts deportation would have on the deportee, his family, his local community, and 
the country.” See Banks, Cases for Proportional Deportation, supra note 6, at 1267–68.
136. See Banks, Cases for Proportional Deportation, supra note 6, at 1268 (describing
broad range of factors contributing to proportionality analysis in immigration law);
Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement, supra note 6, at 482 (describing the European legal
tradition of balancing “the individual’s circumstances against the nation-state’s interest in
removal[]”). 
137. See Johan Rochel, Working in Tandem: Proportionality and Procedural
Guarantees in EU Immigration Law, 20 Ger. L.J. 89, 104 (2019) (noting that proportionality,
when applied to the right to a reasoned decision, “would require the public authority to
identify the relevant information to be delivered in order to reach a sufcient threshold of 
quality in the justification”).
138. See id. (characterizing the objective of applying proportionality to the right to a 
reasoned decision as “challeng[ing] the justification presented by the public authority on
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avoid arbitrary agency decisionmaking.139 Jud Mathews describes classic 
proportionality review as “designed to detect and correct a particular kind 
of administrative failure: an overreach, in which the government uses 
measures that are excessive in relation to the ends they are designed to 
achieve.”140 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), while making no
mention of “proportionality,” authorizes federal courts to conduct arbi-
trary and capricious review of final agency action to correct for both over-
reach and underreach.141 Mathews describes this “hard look” version of
arbitrary and capricious review as most comparable to classic proportion-
ality review:142 A court reviews an agency’s reasoning and assesses whether 
the agency gave the issue before it a “hard look.”143 
In the leading case showcasing hard look review, the Supreme Court 
engaged in a review of agency action resembling proportionality review. In
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., the Court deemed an agency regulation “arbitrary and capricious” 
when the agency failed to adequately explain its reasoning for adopting a 
specific policy.144 Congress enacted the National Trafc and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966 to address the national problem of trafc accidents and 
their resulting deaths and injuries.145 Through the Act, Congress dele-
gated responsibility to the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate
safety standards, and the Department of Transportation initially issued a
rule requiring the installation of seatbelts in all cars.146 But drivers and
passengers simply did not use seatbelts consistently.147 For that reason, the
Department of Transportation began considering automatic crash protec-
tion in the form of automatic seatbelts and airbags, ultimately issuing a 
rule requiring car manufacturers to provide either.148 The National
139. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003) (arguing that administrative le-
gitimacy lies principally in its avoidance of arbitrary agency decisionmaking).
140. Jud Mathews, Agency Discretion, Judicial Review, and ‘Proportionality’ in US
Administrative Law, in The Judge and the Proportionate Use of Discretion 160, 161 (Sophia 
Ranchordás & Boudewijn de Waard eds., 2016).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018); see also Mathews, supra note 140, at 177 (describing
arbitrary and capricious review as “symmetrical in a way that classic proportionality review 
is not: administrative action is subject to challenge . . . whether the claim is that the agency
has done too much or that it has not done enough”). 
142. See Mathews, supra note 140, at 174–80.
143. See id. at 170; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (providing guidelines for the kinds of reasoning that are arbitrary
and capricious and otherwise would not be considered giving the issue a “hard look”).
144. 463 U.S. at 46, 48.
145. Id. at 33.
146. Id. at 33–34.
147. Id. at 34 (“It soon became apparent that the level of seatbelt use was too low to 
reduce trafc injuries to an acceptable level.”).
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Highway Trafc Safety Administration (NHTSA) subsequently deter-
mined, after extensive study, that automatic seatbelts would not “produce 
significant safety benefits”149 because passengers would simply disable the
feature.150 NHTSA then rescinded the entire rule.151 Reviewing this rescis-
sion, the Court chided NHTSA for failing to explain why it would not
simply continue to require airbags, the other automatic crash protection 
option.152 The Court noted that “an agency must cogently explain why it 
has exercised its discretion in a given manner,”153 and that an agency
changing course “must supply a reasoned analysis.”154 
Commentators describe proportionality review as more demanding
than the bare minimum of reasoned administration.155 This makes intui-
tive sense: Providing a reason for government action does not mean the 
reason is compelling or well supported. Despite the divergence of propor-
tionality review and arbitrary and capricious review, however, the idea re-
mains: Arbitrary and capricious review serves as a check on the arbitrary
exercise of government power by requiring government ofcials to give 
reasons for restrictions on liberty.156 
Guarding against excessive government restriction on liberty relates
to a broader norm of reason giving in administrative law. Jerry Mashaw 
grounds reason giving in the Constitution, statutes, executive orders, and 
regulations, as well as administrative law doctrine developed in the 
149. Id. at 38.
150. Id. at 38–39 (noting that passive belts “could be easily detached”). 
151. Id. at 39 (noting the challenge to NHTSA’s rescission).
152. Id. at 46–48 (noting that the efectiveness of airbags “would suggest that the logical
response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the installation of
airbags”).
153. Id. at 48.
154. Id. at 57 (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 444
F.2d 841, 852 (1970)). But see Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 
U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (noting that an agency changing course must supply good reasons for 
the new policy, but “it need not demonstrate . . . that the reasons for the new policy are better
than the reasons for the old one”). 
155. Mathews notes that proportionality review is an integrated element of review in 
jurisdictions like the EU. See Mathews, supra note 140, at 168 n.40 (referring to proportion-
ality as “a general criterion of review in EU law”). This demands a tight fit between means
and ends. See Jud Mathews, Proportionality Review in Administrative Law, in Comparative 
Administrative Law 405, 405 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth & Blake Emerson 
eds., 2d ed. 2017) (describing proportionality review by courts to involve a “sequence of
increasingly stringent legal tests, in order to determine whether the measure in fact im-
pinges disproportionately on the rights or interests of a party”). In contrast, arbitrary and
capricious review in U.S. administrative law is more tolerant of government action and easier 
to satisfy. See Mathews, supra note 140, at 168–69.
156. See Bressman, supra note 139, at 473–74 (explaining that the purpose of requiring












   
 















2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2069 
courts.157 The Constitution imposes the barest requirement that govern-
ment action pursue an authorized public purpose,158 but the Supreme
Court has also imposed reason-giving requirements based on procedural
due process.159 Agencies, moreover, are “awash in statutory requirements
for reason giving, analysis, and explanation.”160 Mashaw notes that admin-
istrative law imposes reason giving even in settings that lack the traditional 
instrumental rationales, like “the protection of legal rights or the facilita-
tion of judicial review.”161 Accordingly, reason giving potentially has a role
even when the agency’s decisions are not subject to judicial review, and the 
individuals impacted have no legal right at stake, e.g., when someone
stands to benefit from a favorable exercise of agency discretion.162 Unsur-
prisingly, notice and an explanation are the core of good administra-
tion.163 Building on this connection between proportionality, justification, 
and arbitrariness, this Article argues for reframing the proportionality dis-
course to emphasize the central role of reason giving in creating more tai-
lored immigration sanctions. This, in turn, centers the role of the 
immigration bureaucracy.
II. UNDER THE HOOD OF THE IMMIGRATION BUREAUCRACY
Against the backdrop of failed eforts at legislative reform and re-
jected constitutional proportionality arguments, this Article examines not 
the formal terms of the INA, but executive branch implementation as a 
potential locus of proportionality. It reveals that, contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom, immigration law imposes a range of penalties short of de-
portation. Given the INA’s lack of nuance and the persistent limits on
157. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration and Democratic Legitimacy: How
Administrative Law Supports Democratic Government 41 (2018) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Reasoned Administration and Democratic Legitimacy] (“Reason-giving and reasonableness
requirements come from multiple sources—the Constitution, congressional statutes, exec-
utive orders, and administrative regulations, in addition to the case law of judicial review of 
administrative action. The content of those requirements [is] wonderfully 
heterogeneous.”). 
158. Id. at 43.
159. Id. at 44 & n.15.
160. Id. at 44; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, 
the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 99, 100 
(2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reasoned Administration] (citing the Administrative
Procedure Act as codified in 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2019) as establishing a right “to obtain rea-
sons for administrative decisions”). 
161. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 157, at 
53.
 162. See id.
163. See Mashaw, Reasoned Administration, supra note 160, at 99–100 (noting that EU
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enforcement capacity, the INA implicitly delegates substantial policymak-
ing discretion to the President.164 The agency responsible for enforcing
immigration law, DHS, exercises discretion throughout the process of ap-
prehending potentially deportable immigrants, charging them, pursuing
final orders of removal, and executing those orders.165 Like all administra-
tive agencies, DHS frequently decides to pursue a sanction less severe than 
the one specified in its governing statute due to limited resources, agency 
convenience, and equitable discretion.166 Some of these tools have an ex-
plicit statutory basis, while others are based on authority implicitly dele-
gated to the agency.167 But due to their relative informality and poor
development, these tools fail to systematically distinguish among those im-
migrants meriting lenience and those whom the agency will deport. As a
result, the immigration bureaucracy currently lacks adequate safeguards
to prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power. A system of suf-
cient justification—what proportionality demands—cannot be realized 
without the building blocks of reasoned, nonarbitrary administration. 
The immigration bureaucracy extends well beyond DHS, encompass-
ing a range of agencies and actors. Although enforcement ofcials work
for DHS,168 adjudicators work for the Department of Justice (DOJ).169 
Within DOJ, the Executive Ofce of Immigration Review houses the im-
migration courts and the BIA, a specialized appellate body.170 But other 
agencies play an integral role as well. For example, the Department of
State performs consular processing for overseas visa applicants;171 the De-
partment of Labor adjudicates aspects of petitions for certain employ-
ment-based visas;172 and the Department of Health and Human Services 
164. See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 6, at 680–83; Adam B. Cox & 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L.J. 458, 463 (2009). 
165. See Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 60, at 2–3.
166. See Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality
in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1029, 1039–40 (2017) [hereinafter Cade,
Judging Immigration Equity].
167. Ben Harrington, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45158, An Overview of Discretionary 
Reprieves From Removal: Deferred Action, DACA, TPS, and Others 4–7 (2018).
168. Immigration Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/ 
topic/immigration-enforcement-overview [https://perma.cc/4EV3-QFZV] (last updated
May 24, 2021).
169. About the Ofce, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-ofce
[https://perma.cc/7NZQ-S6L4] (last updated Feb. 3, 2021).
 170. Id. 
171. Immigrant Visa Processing—General FAQs, U.S. Dep’t of State—Bureau of
Consular Afs., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/national-
visa-center/immigrant-visas-processing-general-faqs.html [https://perma.cc/38C6-LAHT]
(last visited July 26, 2021).
172. Permanent Labor Certification, U.S. Dep’t of Lab.: Emp. & Training Admin.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/programs/permanent/ [https://perma. 
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oversees the Ofce of Refugee Resettlement.173 However, for the purposes 
of this Article, the “immigration bureaucracy” refers to enforcement of-
cials and adjudicators who have discretion to impose shadow sanctions. 
A. The Structure of Enforcement
Understanding how the immigration enforcement bureaucracy de-
cides whom to deport requires understanding the structure of enforce-
ment. Since its debut in the early twentieth century, the core functions of
the immigration bureaucracy have shifted from agency to agency. The 
Treasury Department oversaw the first customs inspectors in the federally 
centralized system,174 and the Department of Labor oversaw the first bor-
der patrol, founded in 1924.175 Elements of the immigration bureaucracy 
eventually united into the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
housed within the DOJ.176 After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress dissolved the INS and created DHS as a cabinet-level executive 
department.177 The agency consists of several subunits: Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).178 The attorneys for 
DHS are part of the Ofce of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA).179 CBP 
and ICE are the principal enforcement arms of DHS, whereas USCIS was, 
at least prior to the Trump Administration, conceived of as a more client-
centered, benefits-granting division.180 The enforcement bureaucracy em-
ploys tens of thousands and spans a vast geography. CBP has 60,000 em-
ployees,181 and ICE has more than 20,000 law enforcement and support 
173. Ofce of Refugee Resettlement, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.: Admin. for 
Child. & Fams., https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr [https://perma.cc/fs3y-bexu] (last visited July 
26, 2021).
174. See Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 93; 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Overview of INS History 4 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/INSHistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGJ9-DFNV].
175. Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol 32 (2010).
176. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., supra note 174, at 8.
177. George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security 8, 10–11 (2002), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf [https://perma.cc/X43L-PWMB]. 
178. Operational and Support Components, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., https://
www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://perma.cc/4KP6-RMJL] (last
updated Dec. 3, 2020).
179. Ofce of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www. 
ice.gov/about-ice/opla/ [https://perma.cc/SLA5-JAXY] (last updated June 21, 2021).
180. See, e.g., Elliot Spagat & Sophia Tareen, Under Trump, Citizenship and Visa 
Agency Focuses on Fraud, AP News (Nov. 1, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-
outbreak-immigration-san-diego-0a7a62c68ecf79c884208a6dd5d719b4/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (noting USCIS’s shift under the Trump Administration to “[m]aking 
it tougher [for noncitizens] to get permission to live and work in America”).
181. About CBP, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., https://www.cbp.gov/about/ [https:// 
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personnel in more than 400 ofces around the world.182 CBP enforces im-
migration law at the U.S. border, and ICE enforces immigration law in the 
interior.183 Within ICE, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) focuses on 
investigating criminal organizations.184 A separate unit, Enforcement and 
Removal Operations (ERO) “identifies and removes” immigrants for ordi-
nary immigration law violations.185 ERO has over twenty field ofces, which 
each employ deportation ofcers.186 Among other things, these deporta-
tion ofcers supervise nondetained immigrants awaiting their removal 
hearings and those ordered removed whom the government permits to
stay as long as they check in periodically.187 Both CBP and ICE proclaim 
antiterrorism missions,188 and training opportunities beyond the entry 
level generally emphasize surveillance, marksmanship, and threat re-
sponse.189 But the national security rhetoric of both subagencies defies the 
benign profile of a substantial proportion of deportees.190 
DHS runs on billions in appropriations every year,191 and appropria-
tions have increased in real terms since the agency’s inception.192 In addi-
tion to robust annual funding, DHS routinely receives supplemental 
182. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https:
//www.ice.gov/about-ice/ [https://perma.cc/LA9E-44DU] (last updated July 6, 2021).
183. About CBP, supra note 181.
184. Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice. 
gov/about-ice/homeland-security-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/QA9P-DME9] (last 
updated July 6, 2021).
185. Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://
www.ice.gov/about-ice/ero# [https://perma.cc/MHD4-NLKV] (last updated May 20, 2021).
186. Id. (noting that the Field Operations division of ERO “[o]versees, directs, coordi-
nates, and supports ERO’s 24 field ofces”). 
187. Id. 
188. ICE’s Mission, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/mission/ 
[https://perma.cc/2LBT-S3A9] (last updated May 13, 2021). 
189. Training Catalog, Fed. L. Enf’t Training Ctrs., https://www.fletc.gov/training-
catalog/ [https://perma.cc/C5F6-PY2Z] (last visited July 26, 2021). 
190. Clara Long, Brian Root & Grace Meng, The Deported: Immigrants Uprooted From
the Country They Call Home, Hum. Rts. Watch (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report 
/2017/12/06/deported/immigrants-uprooted-country-they-call-home/ [https://perma.cc 
/BPW3-4VTT] (describing increase in arrests of noncitizens without criminal convictions 
under the Trump Administration). 
191. Am. Immigr. Council, The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security
2 (2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_
cost_of_immigration_enforcement_and_border_security.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). 
192. William L. Painter, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44604, Trends in the Timing and Size of 
DHS Appropriations: In Brief 6 (2019) (showing growth in DHS’s regular budget in con-
stant dollars); see also Assessing DHS 10 Years Later: How Wisely Is DHS Spending Taxpayer 
Dollars?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Mgmt. Efciency of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th Cong. 2 (Feb. 15, 2013) (statement of Rep. Duncan) (not-
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appropriations.193 In 2018, for example, funding for CBP, ICE, and the
Ofce of Biometric and Identity Management (OBIM) hit $24 billion, sur-
passing funding of all other principal federal criminal law enforcement 
agencies.194 Commentators have questioned the justification for this level
of spending and how the public should gauge enforcement eforts.195 
At the same time, scholars have critiqued this standard narrative and 
emphasized the challenges of enforcement against a growing population 
of deportable immigrants.196 Now a California Supreme Court Justice,
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar previously observed that, throughout the 
1990s, immigration enforcement ofcials became responsible for a much
larger population of deportable immigrants.197 Adjusted for the size of the
removable population, enforcement budgets decreased until 2005.198 Ulti-
mately, the immigration bureaucracy is large and growing, funded at con-
sistent or rising levels not accounting for the size of the deportable
population. 
Scholars attribute the growth of the modern enforcement bureau-
cracy to history and demography.199 Commercial desire for cheap migrant 
labor led to the deliberate underenforcement of the immigration laws 
through the mid-twentieth century, and the Bracero program created a
channel for Mexican migration to the American Southwest, which contin-
ued long after the program ended.200 As Congress expanded the grounds 
193. Painter, supra note 192, at 3.
194. Doris Meissner & Julia Gelatt, Migration Pol’y Inst., Eight Key U.S. Immigration




196. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 U.C.
Irvine L. Rev. 1, 64 (2012) (characterizing “the apparent upward trajectory in nominal en-
forcement budgets for interior immigration enforcement [as] wildly misleading” because 
of the “major new responsibility of removing a potentially vastly greater proportion of aliens 
because of the expanded criminal-related bases for removal”). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 65 & fig.3.
199. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 106.
200. The Bracero program was a “bilateral system of state-managed labor migration”
from Mexico to the United States. See Hernández, supra note 175, at 110. Through this
program, “healthy, landless, and surplus male agricultural workers from regions not experi-
encing a labor shortage within Mexico were qualified to apply” for agricultural labor con-
tracts on American farms. Id. For discussion of the legacy of the Bracero program for
patterns of Mexican migration to the United States, see Cox & Rodríguez, The President 
and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 42–44, 107–08 (describing the Bracero program and
noting that “[w]hen Congress finally abolished the Bracero program in 1964, its decision 
immediately and directly produced illegal immigration”); Hernández, supra note 175, at 
122–23 (providing data on immigrant returns to Mexico from the years preceding and fol-
lowing the Bracero program); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Im-
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for deportability and limited relief from deportation, the undocumented
immigrant population accreted, creating what Adam B. Cox and Cristina
M. Rodríguez call “the shadow system.”201 They argue that the profound 
“mismatch”202 between the formal law and enforcement realities efected 
a “de facto delegation” of screening authority from Congress to the 
President.203 Although Congress formally determines the grounds of de-
portability, the enforcement bureaucracy decides whom the government 
actually deports.204 
In such a regime, the President has substantial policymaking discre-
tion, at least in theory. Under 6 U.S.C. § 202, Congress tasks the DHS 
Secretary with the responsibility of setting enforcement priorities, but the 
President can establish them through executive order.205 Although the stat-
ute does not obligate the DHS Secretary to set priorities, it does evince
congressional approval of priority setting rather than mechanical execu-
tion.206 It recognizes that the agency will pursue some violators over
others.207 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the executive branch’s discre-
tion not to pursue the deportation of every deportable immigrant.208 In 
Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated certain provisions 
of an Arizona statute relating to unauthorized immigrants.209 The Court
Rev. 1819, 1832 (2011) (noting that the “chronic and knowing underenforcement of immi-
gration law has been an essential part of U.S. immigration history for over a century”).
201. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 111.
 202. Id. 
203. Id. at 112.
204. Id. (“Executive ofcials efectively wield power to decide who belongs in the polity, 
and on what terms, simply by making the day-to-day judgments involved in enforcing the 
law.”). 
205. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 20, 2021).
206. See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 6, at 681–82 (discussing 6 
U.S.C. § 202(5)). 
207. The President cannot suspend the INA, but a considerable gray zone exists be-
tween priority setting and suspension. For example, a district court judge enjoined President
Biden’s proposed moratorium on deportations for 100 days based on the conclusion that
the INA obligated the government to remove noncitizens with final orders of removal within 
ninety days of the orders becoming final. See Texas v. United States, No. 6:21-CV-00003,
2021 WL 2096669, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2021). But the Biden Administration defended the mor-
atorium as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Miriam Jordan, In the First Blow to
Biden’s Immigration Agenda, a Federal Judge Blocks 100-Day Pause on Deportations, N.Y.
Times (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/us/politics/biden-immigrat
ion-deportation.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
208. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012); see also Cade, Judging 
Immigration Equity, supra note 166, at 1048 (characterizing Arizona as recognizing enforce-
ment as the principal site of equitable discretion).
209. 567 U.S. at 400–04 (invalidating section 3 of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, which created a 
new state misdemeanor for “failure to complete or carry an alien registration document” in 
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observed that “[f]ederal governance of immigration and alien status is ex-
tensive and complex.”210 And as a threshold matter, immigration ofcials
“must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”211 The
Court further recognized that the decision not to enforce often reflects
meaningful distinctions among deportable immigrants. For example, 
“[u]nauthorized workers trying to support their families . . . likely pose
less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.”212 
The Court did not address the expansive categories of crime that trigger
deportability or the fact that the contemplated categories often blur— for
instance, immigrants with criminal convictions often also work hard to sup-
port their families—but it did recognize that unauthorized immigrants 
have diverse characteristics calling for complex qualitative judgments.213 
Ultimately, the logic of prioritization reflects longstanding principles
of prosecutorial discretion, but scholars contest its contours.214 Faced with 
limited resources, enforcement ofcials must select whom to pursue and
whom not to. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court confirmed that, out-
side of immigration law, courts lack the authority to review agency deci-
sions setting enforcement priorities because they typically lack “law to
apply” for determining the propriety of nonenforcement in a particular 
case.215 A robust scholarly debate has ensued, however, over the extent to
210. Id. at 395.
211. Id. at 396.
 212. Id. 
213. See id. at 396–97.
214. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 
227 (rejecting the argument that “the Constitution prohibits agency leaders from using
rules to guide the exercise of enforcement discretion by line-level ofcials within the admin-
istrative state”); Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1753, 1800 (2016) (expressing skepticism about the categorical exercise of en-
forcement discretion embodied in the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA)
program based on the “dubious” notion that such exercises of discretion are permitted if
not statutorily prohibited); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 784 (2013) (arguing that the Take Care Clause imposes on 
the President a duty of full enforcement); Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised 
Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration,
63 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 58, 94 (2015) (defending DACA and DAPA as forms of super-
vised and centralized enforcement discretion as a logical mechanism for implementing en-
forcement priorities); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
Vand. L. Rev. 671, 760 (2014) (arguing that DACA amounts to a categorical, prospective 
suspension of the INA and is therefore “presumptively beyond the scope of executive au-
thority”); Shalini Bhargava Ray, Abdication Through Enforcement, 96 Ind. L.J. 1325,
1371(2021) [hereinafter Ray, Abdication Through Enforcement] (arguing that faithful ex-
ecution requires priority setting at a minimum and permits categorical exercises of discre-
tion); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response: In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the 
DREAM Act, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 59, 70 (2013) (arguing that longstanding agency precedent  
supports centralized exercise of enforcement discretion in immigration law). 
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which the President or DHS Secretary has discretion to decline to enforce 
the law categorically. Some argue that categorical nonenforcement 
amounts to suspension of a congressional enactment, a power the
President lacks.216 Others defend categorical nonenforcement when lib-
erty is at stake or on other grounds.217 
Despite the logic behind enforcement priorities, DHS has seldom of-
fered sufcient guidance to enforcement ofcers. Under George W.
Bush’s Administration, for example, a newly formed ICE aimed to remove 
every single removable immigrant,218 otherwise known as “full enforce-
ment.”219 Echoing this approach, the Trump Administration explicitly di-
rected line ofcers to pursue any removable person they encountered.220 
The Executive Associate Director of ERO further required line ofcers to 
initiate removal proceedings against all such persons encountered, which 
some deemed inconsistent with the Trump Administration’s  guidance.221 
In recent years, the Obama Administration stands out for accepting 
the logic of priorities explicitly and thoroughly prioritizing enforcement
eforts.222 President Obama’s DHS used the logic of priorities throughout 
the shadow system, and not only at the front end of enforcement.223 His 
216. See, e.g., Price, supra note 214, at 674–75.
217. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The 
Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 489, 494 (2017).
218. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Bureau of Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Endgame:
Ofce of Detention and Removal Strategic Plan, 2003–2012: Detention and Removal
Strategy for a Secure Homeland 2 (2003), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470051 [https:
//perma.cc/RM2Z-WSYP] (“We must strive for 100% removal rate.”). 
219. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 214, at 799–800 (describing the duty of “strict en-
forcement”); Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 183, 196
n.62 (2016).
220. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
221. Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, to All ERO Employees (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/wp-
content/uploads/icememofeb21.pdf [https://perma.cc/P737-A93U]. For discussion of
these inconsistencies, see Ray, Abdication Through Enforcement, supra note 214, at 1360.
222. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, to All
ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/ 
civil-imm-enforcement-priorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EFN-Z2UM]
[hereinafter Morton Priority Memo] (creating diferent priority levels based on specific cri-
teria); Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (June 15, 
2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals
-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VYL-QD3W] [hereinafter Napolitano,
DACA Memo] (creating DACA).
223. See, e.g., Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 290 (D. Mass. 2018) (describing 
“Operation Indonesian Surrender,” which encouraged Indonesian immigrants who had 
been ordered deported to come “out of the shadows” and enter an ICE program of super-
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DHS recognized that robust enforcement priorities help enforcement of-
ficials systematically and meaningfully distinguish among deportable im-
migrants.224 The Obama Administration further claimed the authority to
exercise prosecutorial discretion at numerous points in the enforcement
process, from apprehension to removal.225 As explained by former ICE di-
rector John Morton, enforcement ofcers face discretionary decisions at
every point in the enforcement process, from issuance of a Notice to
Appear, to stopping, questioning, or arresting a noncitizen for an admin-
istrative violation; to settling or dismissing proceedings; to pursuing an ap-
peal; and to deciding whether to execute a removal order.226 Enforcement
priorities apply at the front end, ofering guidance to line ofcers about 
whom to target, as well as on the backend, potentially guiding ofcers at
countless points after a final order of removal has been issued.227 
Eforts to rationalize immigration enforcement discretion face many
challenges.228 But the long history of immigration prosecutorial discretion
demonstrates that the immigration bureaucracy can articulate the relevant 
(Dec. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/nyregion/13indonesians.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Obama-era deals to permit immigrants 
ordered deported to remain on supervised release with work permits). 
224. Scholars have noted that line ofcers often ignore, resist, and resent enforcement
priorities, creating the need for a way to bind line ofcers’ discretion. See Michael Kagan, 
Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President Obama’s
Immigration Actions, 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 665, 686 (2016) [hereinafter Kagan, Binding the
Enforcers] (noting that the Obama Administration’s approach to enforcement discretion
followed in part from the challenge of trying “to induce a government agency to exercise
self-restraint against what it sees as its core mission”). On those grounds, a program like
DACA efectively centralizes enforcement discretion and deprives line ofcers of the power 
to undermine executive judgments about priorities. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law: Redux, 125 Yale L.J. 104, 183–86 (2015) 
[hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux] (stating that 
DACA’s centralization of decisionmaking has been a “significant improvement[] on the
practices of difused prosecutorial discretion that preceded [it]”). In a recent article, I argue
that enforcement priorities are essential to faithful execution of the immigration laws, in 
part because of the formal lack of graduated sanctions on the backend. See Ray, Abdication 
Through Enforcement, supra note 214, at 1368.
225. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 224, at
676–77.
226. See Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 60, at 2–3.
227. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 9 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 243, 244, 255 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, The Role
of Prosecutorial Discretion] (discussing when prosecutorial discretion applies). 
228. Streamlining or regularizing the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law 
can be challenging due to the law’s structural features. For instance, immigration ofcers 
have authority both to arrest and charge noncitizens, and typical equitable variables to guide 
discretion, such as the existence of exculpatory evidence, don’t apply as directly in immigra-
tion law. See id. at 274–76 (describing the diferences between prosecutorial discretion in
the criminal and immigration contexts, and noting that variables to guide discretion “do 
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factors.229 Enforcement priorities convey the government’s understanding
of the qualities that might render someone fit to remain in the United 
States despite having violated immigration law.230 They also promote the
quick (even if transient) resolution of straightforward cases, promoting
efciency and the agency’s convenience.231 Ultimately, pervasive discretion 
shapes the structure of immigration enforcement.
B. Backend Shadow Sanctions
Enforcement priorities are one tool for coping with the inadequacies
of the INA, but beyond that, the immigration bureaucracy uses discretion-
ary tools of lenience on the backend. These backend sanctions constitute
a system of shadow sanctions. They encompass those explicitly authorized 
by statute and those based on an implied delegation of authority to the
agency.232 Protection from removal based on Temporary Protected Status
or DHS’s parole power are based explicitly on statutory text.233 Some re-
prieves, however, such as deferred action, Deferred Enforced Departure
(DED), or Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD), are not defined in the 
INA but are inferred as exercises of prosecutorial discretion.234 Finally, 
some reprieves are granted “[e]xclusively in [c]onnection with the 
[r]emoval process.”235 These forms of reprieves include administrative clo-
sure, voluntary departure, stays of removal, and orders of supervision.236 
Although these reprieves do not grant afrmative immigration status, they
typically come with benefits such as work authorization, and in some cases, 
229. See id. at 255 (discussing the Meissner Memo’s identification of humanitarian fac-
tors to guide prosecutorial discretion).
230. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (noting that federal 
immigration ofcials might decide not to pursue removal in light of “immediate human
concerns”).
231. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 268 (noting 
the cost-based justification for enforcement discretion); see also Kanstroom, Smart(er)
Enforcement, supra note 6, at 491 (noting that graduated sanctions also promote ef-
ciency). Justice Clarence Thomas recently characterized deferred action as solely a matter 
of the agency’s convenience, belying historical understandings of prosecutorial discretion. 
See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1919–32 (2020) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
232. See Harrington, supra note 167, at 6 (noting that criteria for granting reprieves are 
generally set forth in agency manuals and policy memos, but for some reprieves, it can be 
difcult to locate a controlling document). 
233. Id. at 2; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2018) (Temporary Protected Status); 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5 (2020) (parole power).
234. See Harrington, supra note 167, at 12–15.
235. Id. at 18–20.
236. Id. at 20; see also Geofrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 Am. U. L. Rev.
1115, 1129–33 (2015) (discussing the status of deportable noncitizens whom the govern-
ment declines to deport in an exercise of discretion).
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the ability to obtain a driver’s license.237 Opportunities for lenience vary,
but the sanctions surveyed in this section are among the more numerically 
significant of the lot.238 The following sections describe the most relevant 
shadow sanctions and explain their significance for advancing proportion-
ality through the administration of immigration law.
1. Deferred Action. — Deferred action is “a discretionary determina-
tion to defer a removal action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial 
discretion.”239 It can be ofered before a deportable immigrant is appre-
hended to encourage them to come forward, but it has historically been
used to defer deportation for an immigrant already in the system—either 
in removal proceedings or with a final order of removal. 240 
Over a decade ago, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia uncovered deferred ac-
tion’s long (and lost) history in U.S. immigration law.241 Wadhia
discovered that the INS first issued guidance for grants of deferred action
in 1975, initially labeling it as “nonpriority status” for certain cases.242 In
its Operations Instructions, the agency considered factors including the 
age of the noncitizen, the length of presence in the United States,
“physical or mental condition[s] requiring care or treatment in the United 
States,” family situation, and “criminal, immoral, or subversive activities or
afliations.”243 Because of the prominence of medical need as a 
justification for deferred action, commentators often refer to it as
“medical” deferred action.244 Wadhia has observed that one of the first 
federal appellate decisions discussing the nonpriority status program 
referred to it as “an informal administrative stay of deportation.”245 
Subsequent appeals courts characterized nonpriority status either as a
237. See Heeren, supra note 236, at 1170, 1172 (discussing eligibility for driver’s licenses
and work authorization). 
238. See Harrington, supra note 167, at 12–15 (discussing generally available reprieves
premised upon enforcement discretion or executive powers).
239. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.
gov/archive/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/PQ4X-8QXV] (last updated 
July 27, 2021).
240. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 263 (noting that 
deferred action is typically ofered “to suspend removal proceedings against a particular 
individual or group of individuals for a specific timeframe”). 
241. See id. at 246–48 (discussing the history of prosecutorial discretion, as “revealed 
by INS in 1975 as a consequence of litigation involving John Lennon and Yoko Ono”).
 242. Id. 
243. Id. at 248.
244. See Letter from Sen. Edward J. Markey, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Rep. Ayanna 
Pressley & Sen. Cory A. Booker, to Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Senior Of. Performing the Duties 
of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Apr. 23, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing medical deferred action). 
245. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 248 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting Lennon v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 191 
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matter of the then-INS’s administrative convenience or humanitarian 
purposes.246 The INS later rescinded this guidance.247 
INS and then what became ICE have issued guidance on prosecutorial
discretion since that time,248 but the most significant guidance in recent
years came from the Obama Administration. In the first of two memo-
randa (the Morton Memos), John Morton, the head of ICE, issued inter-
pretive guidance to direct enforcement eforts toward public safety risks 
rather than long-term residents without criminal convictions.249 Building 
on a long history of INS interpretive guidance on enforcement priorities,
the first Morton Memo identified as the first priority “aliens who pose a
danger to national security or a risk to public safety.”250 The second priority
was “recent illegal entrants,” and the third priority was noncitizens subject
to removal who had absconded, i.e., “fugitives,” or noncitizens who “oth-
erwise obstruct immigration controls.”251 These priorities convey a familiar
set of concerns: public safety, valuing the ties of long-term residents, and 
preserving the integrity of immigration controls. In a second memo, 
Morton identified the factors that would warrant a favorable exercise of 
discretion.252 
The extensive commentary on the Morton Memos typically focuses on 
their mixed success. Overall, the memos had a limited impact on how line 
ofcers directed their eforts.253 The Morton Memos faced considerable 
headwinds within ICE.254 In addition, the Morton Memos identified factors
to consider but ofered little guidance to line ofcers about how to weigh
246. See id. at 249.
247. Kate M. Manuel & Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42924, Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Immigration Enforcement: Legal Issues 25 (2013).
248. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 259–60 (dis-
cussing agency guidance memoranda). 
249. See Morton Priority Memo, supra note 222, at 3 (“Resources should be committed 
primarily to advancing the priorities set forth . . . in order to best protect national security
and public safety and to secure the border.”); Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 60, at 2 
(noting how ICE must prioritize national security, border security, and public safety). 
250. See Morton Priority Memo, supra note 222, at 1.
251. Id. at 2.
252. See Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 60, at 4–5 (identifying factors warranting 
a favorable exercise of discretion). 
253. See, e.g., David Leopold, Detroit ICE Director Adducci Missed the Morton Memo, 
Hill (June 10, 2014), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/208821-detroit-
ice-director-adducci-missed-the-morton-memo/ [https://perma.cc/YFM4-NJTE] (describing
ICE enforcement practices as failing to conform to the Morton Memo’s guidance); see also
Cuéllar, supra note 196, at 51 (noting limits on the President’s policymaking in immigration 
law given agency resistance).
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the factors, hindering change in enforcement patterns.255 But scholars 
note that the Morton Memos represented an important step in the right 
direction, even if, on their own, they failed to change the agency’s
culture.256 
The Obama Administration eventually rescinded the Morton Memos 
and adopted more structured guidance.257 Through new interpretive guid-
ance issued in 2012, it announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA).258 Benefitting more than 825,000 noncitizens to date, 259 DACA
shields from deportation noncitizens who had been brought to the United
States before sixteen years of age, who fulfill specific criteria, and who lack
lawful status.260 In addition to shielding recipients from removal for renew-
able two-year periods, DACA also made recipients eligible for benefits, 
such as work authorization.261 The Supreme Court recently observed that
DACA recipients have pursued higher education, bought homes and cars, 
255. See Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 224, at 679 (discussing an ACLU
attorney’s frustration at the Morton Memos’ failure to produce the intended efect of help-
ing individuals in “low-priority” categories).
256. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 
172 (“While it would be easy to label the Morton Memos a failure . . . [they] should be un-
derstood as inaugurating a remarkably difcult project of bureaucratic redirection that
hardly could have been expected to bear fruit in just a few months.”); Kagan, Binding the 
Enforcers, supra note 224, at 676–80 (describing how the Morton Memos were notable for 
the transparency they signaled, even if they remained vague on how prosecutorial discretion
should be exercised); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigr. Pol’y Ctr., Reading the Morton 
Memo: Federal Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion 4 (2010), https://www.american 
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Shoba_-_Reading_the_Morton_Memo 
_120110.pdf [https://perma.cc/H746-AQ4H] [hereinafter Wadhia, Reading the Morton
Memo] (“[T]he ‘Morton Memo’ potentially marks a new phase in the enforcement of im-
migration law.”). 
257. See Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 224, at 679 (noting the rescission of
the Morton Memos).
258. See Napolitano, DACA Memo, supra note 222 (establishing the DACA program). 
259. Nichole Prchal Svajlenka & Philip E. Wolgin, What We Know About the 




260. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-child
hood-arrivals-daca/ [https://perma.cc/99ZU-DEXT] (last updated July 19, 2021). 
261. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2020) (permitting recipients of deferred action to 
apply for work authorization). The mass-grant of work authorization led critics, like former
Attorney General Jef Sessions, to argue that DACA was illegal. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1911 (2020) (describing Attorney General 
Sessions’s opinion, based on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of a related deferred action program 
known as DAPA, that the “core” issue was the class-wide grant of eligibility for benefits “to
unauthorized aliens” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Texas v. United States,
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gotten married, and further integrated into U.S. society in their 
adulthood.262 
DACA represents a relatively structured exercise of discretion, despite
the Obama Administration’s decision not to undertake notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking in establishing the program.263 By establishing public cri-
teria, DHS eliminated one traditional source of arbitrariness, but DHS also 
recognized that public criteria alone, as seen with the Morton Memos, can-
not necessarily overcome institutional resistance. DACA therefore ex-
ploited the structure of DHS to create enforcement priorities that line 
ofcers would have to honor.264 Instead of empowering ICE agents to ac-
cept and adjudicate DACA applications for individuals not already in re-
moval proceedings, DHS assigned the task to USCIS.265 In so doing, the 
DHS Secretary ensured that the “benefits-granting component” of the 
agency would have responsibility for adjudicating the applications of eligi-
ble noncitizens.266 
2. Administrative Closure. — Administrative closure refers to the prac-
tice of IJs or the BIA temporarily closing cases without adjudicating the 
merits.267 IJs and BIA members are not part of DHS. Instead, as discussed 
above, they are part of the Executive Ofce for Immigration Review, 
housed within the DOJ.268 Often, these adjudicators closed cases to permit
262. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1914.
263. See Napolitano, DACA Memo, supra note 222, at 1–2 (setting forth clear criteria 
for considering deferred action and exercising prosecutorial discretion); see also Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1918 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement in part and 
dissenting in part) (describing the “impasse” over the status of undocumented children,
which led President Obama to take “matters into his own hands” without delegated author-
ity from Congress and “without undertaking a rulemaking”). 
264. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 224, at
179–80 (explaining how DACA’s structure significantly limits prosecutorial discretion).
265. Id. at 193–94 (describing DHS’s decision to shift responsibility from ICE to USCIS).
266. Id. at 194. Ming Hsu Chen’s research complicates this narrative about USCIS’s ben-
efits-granting culture. See Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and
Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 347, 388 (2017) [hereinafter Chen,
Administrator-in-Chief]. Chen reveals that, prior to DACA, USCIS routinely issued Notices 
to Appear to immigrants denied benefits, seamlessly shifting from benefits adjudication to
enforcement. She describes this as a vestige of USCIS’s culture of “following rules literally.”
Id. at 387. Once DACA was announced, and USCIS received additional resources to adjudi-
cate DACA applications, new attorneys joined the agency “for the express purpose of fur-
thering the agency’s DACA mandate.” Id. 
267. Maria Baldini-Potermin, Immigration Trial Handbook, Motion for Administrative
Closure § 5.25 (2019) (noting that administrative closure “permits removal of cases from 
the calendar for administrative convenience” but “does not result in a final order”);
Elizabeth Montano, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Closure in Immigration Courts, 129 
Yale L.J. Forum 567, 567 (2020) (noting that administrative closure allows an IJ or the BIA
to “temporarily remove a case from their active docket or calendar”). 
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noncitizens to seek relief outside of the removal proceeding, such as ap-
pealing a criminal conviction or applying for a visa.269 The Fourth Circuit 
has described administrative closure as a “procedural mechanism primar-
ily employed for the convenience of the adjudicator (namely, IJs and the 
BIA) in order to allow cases to be removed from the active dockets of im-
migration courts, often so individuals can pursue alternate immigration
remedies.”270 The court has emphasized that administrative closure
amounts to a temporary pause in proceedings rather than a final adjudi-
cation or a form of lasting relief from removal.271 
Judges and agency ofcials have typically understood the authority for
administrative closure to emanate from the inherent docket management 
powers of IJs and the BIA. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b), IJs and the BIA 
are authorized to “take any action consistent with their authorities under
the [INA] and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the dispo-
sition of . . . cases.”272 According to Elizabeth Montano, the practice devel-
oped in the 1980s after a DOJ memorandum identified administrative 
closure as an authorized tool for IJs to pause cases in which the respondent 
had failed to appear for a hearing.273 As with deferred action or nonprior-
ity status, a guidance document articulated for the first time latent discre-
tion authorized by statute.274 During this era, administrative closure was
available whenever both sides consented to it.275 
In 2012, however, the BIA extended the availability of administrative 
closure. In In re Avetisyan, the BIA ruled that requiring the consent of both 
sides interfered with IJs’ and the BIA’s independent judgment about the
propriety of administrative closure.276 As a result, IJs and the Board could 
independently determine that administrative closure was warranted, even
269. See Montano, supra note 267, at 574 (noting that “[IJs] routinely granted admin-
istrative closure when an outstanding action or event was relevant to the necessity or merits
of the removal proceedings,” such as “the processing of a visa petition or the appeal of a
criminal conviction, which, if successful, would render the removal proceedings moot”). 
270. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2019).
271. Id. at 286. But see Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigr. Judge, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., to All Immigr. Judges, Ct. Adm’rs, Att’y Advisors & Jud. L. Clerks & Immigr. 
Ct. Staf 3 (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/ 
03/08/13-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/72GK-5H8C] (describing administrative closure as a 
“type of completion in our docketing system, [which] results in the case being closed”).
272. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2020).
273. Montano, supra note 267, at 570–71.
274. See Wadhia, Beyond Deportation, supra note 59, at 55 (“INS first used the term 
‘deferred action’ in an internal memorandum known as an ‘Operations Instruction.’”); 
Montano, supra note 267, at 570–71.
275. See Montano, supra note 267, at 571 (describing earlier BIA precedent establishing
the rule that administrative closure should not be used if either side objects).
276. 25 I&N Dec. 688, 690 (B.I.A. 2012) (“We now find that it is improper to aford
absolute deference to a party’s objection, and we hold that an [IJ] or the Board has the 
authority to administratively close a case, even if a party opposes, if it is otherwise appropri-
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over the objection of one of the parties.277 Avetisyan marked the start of an 
era in which IJs granted administrative closure to accommodate events 
“relevant to the necessity or merits of the removal proceedings.”278 
DHS has also sought administrative closure of “low-priority” cases to
direct resources toward high-priority cases. The 2011 Morton Memo 
stated, “Cases deemed as ‘low priority’ will be administratively closed, and
respondents in those cases may be eligible to apply to the USCIS for an 
employment authorization document.”279 In this way, administrative clo-
sure suspended deportation (sometimes indefinitely), thereby serving as a
prioritization tool.280 
Then-Attorney General Jef Sessions revoked this power in his deci-
sion, In re Castro-Tum.281 The National Association of Immigration Judges
defended administrative closure as an essential tool of docket manage-
ment,282 and immigrants’ rights advocates noted its role in protecting 
noncitizens’ due process rights,283 but Sessions viewed the practice as con-
flicting with the “expeditious enforcement of our immigration laws.”284 
Sessions referenced statistics from the Executive Ofce for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) indicating that the use of administrative closure had accel-
277. Montano, supra note 267, at 572.
278. Id. at 574.
279. Philip Hornik, Nat’l Immigr. Project of the Nat’l Laws. Guild, 1 Immigration Law
and Defense § 8.52 (2021); see also Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in
Immigration Adjudication, 93 Tul. L. Rev. 707, 746 (2019) (noting Sessions’s complaint that 
“DHS had used this practice under the Obama Administration ‘as a way to decline to pros-
ecute low priority cases’” (quoting In re Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 276 (A.G. 2018))). 
But some have observed that anecdotal evidence undermines this narrative of the “equita-
ble” use of administrative closure. See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 6,
at 694 (“There is also anecdotal evidence that, even when administrative closure is ofered, 
many ICE attorneys do so ‘not to bufer overly harsh applications of immigration law in low-
priority cases, but rather to avoid having to litigate hearings when the noncitizen may be 
eligible for more far-reaching relief.’” (quoting Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing
Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2014))).
280. See Ming H. Chen, Where You Stand Depends On Where You Sit: Bureaucratic
Politics in Federal Workplace Agencies Serving Undocumented Workers, 33 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 227, 292 (2012) (discussing this function of administrative closure). 
281. Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. at 272 (“I hold that [IJs] and the Board do not have the
general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative clo-
sure.”).
282. See Montano, supra note 267, at 578 (discussing  the letter from the National 
Association of Immigration Judges to Sessions).
283. Am. Immigr. Lawyers’ Ass’n, AILA Policy Brief: Imposing Numeric Quotas on 
Judges Threatens the Independence and Integrity of Courts (2017),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-policy-brief-imposing-numeric-quotas-judges [https://
perma.cc/AKT9-KARX] (explaining that when dockets are overloaded, judges are forced 
to move more quickly through each case, compromising their ability to consider each case’s 
unique facts). 
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erated from 2011 to 2017, which saw over 200,000 administrative clo-
sures.285 In Castro-Tum, Sessions opined: “DHS used administrative closure
as a way to decline to prosecute low priority cases without formally termi-
nating them.”286 After finding no express authorization for the practice in
the INA or regulations, Sessions concluded that IJs’ inherent powers to
manage the docket did not include indefinitely suspending an
adjudication.287 
A year after the revocation, the Fourth Circuit held that the applicable 
regulations unambiguously confer on IJs and the BIA the authority to ad-
ministratively close cases.288 In Romero v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit inter-
preted the regulation and determined that its plain meaning granted IJs 
and the BIA the power to manage their dockets in any way.289 The Seventh 
Circuit interpreted the regulation similarly.290 In Morales v. Barr, the court 
held that, “[o]n its face, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) grants [IJs] broad author-
ity.”291 In permitting “any action consistent with their authorities . . . that
is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases,” the regula-
tion used “capacious” phrasing and, the court concluded, plainly author-
ized administrative closure.292 The Third Circuit recently joined the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Arcos Sanchez v. Attorney General United 
States.293 
Facing defeat in the federal appeals courts, the Trump Administration
turned to regulatory reform. In August 2020, EOIR proposed a new rule
to strip IJs of closure authority, underscoring the precarity of relying on 
discretion to enact substantive justice.294 In December 2020, the agency
published the final rule and amended the applicable regulations to “make 
clear that those provisions . . . provide no freestanding authority for [IJs]
285. Id. at 273 (“Statistics . . . reveal that over three decades . . . 283,366 cases were ad-
ministratively closed. But in a mere six years, from October 1, 2011 through September 30,
2017, [IJs] and the Board ordered administrative closure in 215,285 additional cases, nearly
doubling the total number of cases . . . .”).
286. Id. at 276.
287. Id. at 284.
288. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2019). 
289. See id.
290. Morales v. Barr, 963 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2020). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. 997 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 2021) (“We are fully persuaded that, as discussed in
Romero and Meza Morales, the regulations aford IJs and the Board authority to take any action
(including administrative closure) as is appropriate and necessary . . . for the disposition of such
case . . . .”). But see Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding
that the regulations did not unambiguously authorize the general use of administrative
closure). 
294. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; 
Administrative Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,491, 52,493 (proposed Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codi-
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or Board members to administratively close immigration cases absent an 
express regulatory or judicially approved settlement basis to do so.”295 A 
district court preliminarily enjoined this rule nationwide,296 and Attorney 
General Merrick Garland overruled Castro-Tum a few months later.297 
Administrative closure has helped facilitate lawful status for thousands
of immigrants in removal proceedings.298 The Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University found that each re-
moval from the docket typically closed a case for an average of around 
three years.299 When administratively closed cases were recalendared and 
then decided, over 60% of immigrants whom the government initially 
sought to remove qualified for remaining in the United States legally.300 
This means that, in most cases, closing the case temporarily allowed the
noncitizen to acquire lawful status. However, not all administratively closed
cases have been recalendared.301 Over 292,000 cases remained closed as of 
July 2020, about one-quarter of which were closed due to Obama-era pros-
ecutorial discretion policies.302 TRAC’s analysis demonstrates that elimi-
nating administrative closure would push the active workload from over
1.2 million cases to over 1.5 million, a jump of nearly one-quarter of cur-
rently active cases.303 The recent push to end administrative closure also 
reveals the precarity of the shadow system. 
During the Obama Administration, administrative closure protected 
a significant number of deportable immigrants on equitable grounds.304 
According to TRAC’s data, 376,439 cases were removed from the immigra-
tion courts’ “active workload and associated hearing calendar” from 1986 
295. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; 
Administrative Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,588, 81,590 (Dec. 16, 2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003, 1240 (2020)).
296. Centro Legal de la Raza v. Exec. Of. for Immigr. Rev., No. 21-cv-00463-SI, 2021 WL
916804, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2021) (granting a preliminary injunction based on the
plaintifs’ likelihood of success on a claim that the rule violated the APA).
297. In re Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326, 329 (A.G. 2021) (overruling Castro-Tum “in its
entirety”). 
298. The Life and Death of Administrative Closure, Transactional Recs. Access 
Clearinghouse Immigr. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/623/ 




 302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. See Cecilia Muñoz, Immigration Update: Maximizing Public Safety and Better
Focusing Resources, White House: President Barack Obama (Aug. 18, 2011), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-public
-safety-and-better-focusing-resources/ [https://perma.cc/B52V-LQLS] (explaining that
DHS prioritized the removal of people convicted of crimes in the United States over “low 
priorit[y]” deportations). 
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to July 2020.305 Use of administrative closure reached a peak under the 
Obama Administration, particularly during the second term, when admin-
istrative closure accounted for between 8.3% and 26.6% of all case clo-
sures.306 Apart from the standard use of administrative closure, under the
Obama Administration, some 88,249 cases were closed as an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to clear “low-priority” cases from the docket.307 
Used in this way, administrative closure embodies a government judgment 
that lenience is warranted. 
3. Post-Order Forbearance. — Enforcement ofcials use other tools to
select some immigrants for lenience. Courts, as well as DHS, have authority 
to stay removal.308 A judicial stay of removal requires a federal judge to
exercise discretion.309 But the government also has the authority to delay 
execution of a final order of removal if removal is impracticable or other-
wise not in the public interest.310 Here, as well, with respect to DHS, inter-
nal guidance documents identify and define important aspects of this 
discretionary power.311 
Judicial stays are not automatic upon filing of a petition for review in 
a federal court of appeals. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B), “[s]ervice of
the petition [for review] on the ofcer or employee does not stay the re-
moval of an alien pending the court’s decision on the petition, unless the
court orders otherwise.”312 Some federal appeals courts have issued stand-
ing orders that automatically confer stays upon the filing of a motion to
305. TRAC, Administrative Closure, supra note 298.
 306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2018).
309. See id. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (“Service of the petition [for review] on the ofcer or em-
ployee [of the DOJ] does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on
the petition, unless the court orders otherwise.”); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 
(2009) (describing a stay as “an exercise of judicial discretion” (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926))). 
310. DHS may issue work authorization to immigrants on supervised release. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1231 (permitting the Attorney General to issue work authorization to immigrants
on supervised release); 6 U.S.C. § 557 (2018) (transferring that power to the DHS
Secretary); see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial 
Discretion: The Case for Immigration Unexceptionalism, Yale J. on Regul.: Notice & 
Comment (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/employment-authorization-and-
prosecutorial-discretion-the-case-for-immigration-unexceptionalism-by-s/ [https://perma.cc
/R2YD-CXMA] (clarifying that DHS may issue work authorization to immigrants on super-
vised release).
311. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 24, at 1251 (describing internal administrative law
as consisting “of measures governing agency functioning that are created within the agency 
or the executive branch and that speak primarily to government personnel,” whereas exter-
nal administrative law comes primarily from Congress or the courts). 
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stay removal or a petition for review that contains a request for a stay.313 
For example, the Second Circuit entered into an agreement with DHS
known as the “forbearance policy.”314 Pursuant to this policy, once a final 
order of removal is issued and the noncitizen has filed a motion to stay 
removal, the government will not execute the removal order until the 
court has adjudicated the stay motion.315 
Apart from a judicial stay of removal, DHS has the discretion to stay a
deportation upon the noncitizen’s application.316 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and the 
implementing regulation317 authorize supervised release for a noncitizen
ordered removed whose removal is not practicable or would be “contrary 
to the public interest.”318 ICE’s Form I-246 provides individuals ordered
removed with the opportunity to stay their deportation and receive an or-
der of supervision instead.319 If DHS grants the application, it may issue a
Form I-220B, Order of Supervision (OSUP).320 More than one million 
noncitizens have been ordered removed but will not be deported immedi-
ately, provided they check in regularly with ICE pursuant to their
OSUPs.321 
313. De Leon v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 115 F.3d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopt-
ing a procedure that temporarily stayed the petitioner’s deportation upon a filing of a mo-
tion to stay). The Supreme Court has ruled that, in adjudicating motions to stay removal, 
courts should consider the “traditional factors” for adjudicating stays, rather than the more 
stringent standards that the INA imposes for “injunctive relief” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2). 
See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433.
314. See In re Immigr. Petitions for Rev. Pending in the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the
Second Cir., 702 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2012); Trina Realmuto, Jessica Chicco, Nancy
Morawetz & Beth Werlin, Seeking a Judicial Stay of Removal in the Court of Appeals 10 
(2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/
seeking_a_judicial_stay_of_removal_fin_1-21-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS3X-27J6]. 
315. See Realmuto et al., supra note 314, at 10.
316. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.6 (2021).
317. Id. § 274a.12(c)(18). 
318. Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization, supra note 22, at 7–9 (describ-
ing OSUPs and other factors that an ofcial may consider when adjudicating an application 
for employment authorization). 
319. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., OMB No. 1653-0021, Application for a Stay of
Deportation or Removal. 
320. 8 C.F.R. § 241.5.
321. See Michael E. Miller, They Fear Being Deported. But 2.9 Million Immigrants Must 
Check In With ICE Anyway., Wash. Post (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/they-fear-being-deported-but-29-million-immigrants-must-check-in-with-ice-anyway/
2019/04/25/ac74efce-6309-11e9-9f2-abc984dc9eec_story.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (“For the people presenting themselves to immigration authorities, including
more than a million already facing final orders of removal from the United States, each
check-in can feel perilous.”). Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia obtained internal ICE policy docu-
ments revealing a host of other alternatives to detention, namely “Order of Recognizance 
(ROR) . . . , release on bond, release using Enhanced Supervision Reporting (ESR), and the
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The applicable regulation further identifies noncitizens as eligible for
work authorization to include those “against whom a final order of depor-
tation or removal exists and who is released on an order of supervision
under the authority contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).”322 In determin-
ing whether to grant employment authorization under this regulation, the 
district director may consider factors such as the economic necessity for
employment, dependent spouse or children who rely on the noncitizen
for support, and the “anticipated length of time before the [noncitizen] 
can be removed from the United States.”323 Echoing the second Morton
Memo’s consideration for factors such as family ties and economic neces-
sity, OSUPs have an equitable dimension. 
Moreover, internal guidance memoranda reveal qualitative judg-
ments about the relative position of diferent kinds of noncitizens. For ex-
ample, research shows that, as far back as November 2004, ICE ofcials
sought to “standardize the reporting requirements for those aliens re-
leased from detention under an OSUP.”324 Under this framework, remov-
able noncitizens with criminal convictions who have some status other 
than legal permanent residence must check in most frequently—every 
month.325 Legal permanent residents (LPRs) with criminal convictions 
(crimes involving moral turpitude, specifically) were required to check in
every two months.326 Noncitizens without criminal convictions must check
in every three months, and finally, asylum applicants must check in much 
less frequently—every six months.327 Even this simple table of check-ins 
ofers a revealing ordering. First, the highest preferences are for asylum 
seekers (who are awaiting adjudication of their claims and thus might ob-
tain lawful status yet). Noncitizens without criminal convictions (who are
perceived to be less of a threat to public safety regardless of resident status)
are second, LPRs with criminal convictions (who are perceived as more of 
a threat to public safety but privileged for their long-term residence) are 
third, and non-LPRs with criminal convictions (who are immigrants lack-
ing long-term residence in the United States and perceived to pose a safety
Interested Parties 2, 11 (May 4, 2015), https://works.bepress.com/shoba_wadhia/33/ (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). For simplicity, this Part focuses on OSUP.
322. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18). 
323. Id. § 274a.12(c)(18)(i)–(iii). 
324. Rutgers Sch. of L.-Newark Immigrant Rts. Clinic & Am. Friends Serv. Comm., Freed 
but Not Free: A Report Examining the Current Use of Alternatives to Immigration 
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threat) are last. An assessment of relative priority based on a mix of status 
and conduct helps explain this sorting.328 
Immigrants with OSUPs live and work under constant threat of the 
revocation of their status, highlighting the way in which the immigration
bureaucracy lords its discretion over those shown leniency.329 In Devitri v.
Cronen, the petitioners, Indonesian Christians, had unsuccessfully sought 
asylum and had been ordered removed.330 Under an Obama 
Administration humanitarian program, the government encouraged them 
to come forward and receive protection under OSUPs.331 The petitioners
checked in with ICE every thirty days and lived and worked for seven years
“without incident” until the Trump Administration abruptly ended this
particular humanitarian program.332 At that time, ICE informed the peti-
tioners that they would have to depart for Indonesia no later than thirty
days after their next check-in.333 Apart from upending their residence in
the United States, the termination jeopardized their lives due to the wors-
ening plight of religious minorities in Indonesia, especially for Evangelical
Christians such as the petitioners.334 Accordingly, the petitioners sought to 
reopen their cases on account of changed country conditions.335 Given de-
lays inherent in BIA procedure, the petitioners were able to seek a prelim-
inary injunction in federal court.336 The court determined that the 
petitioners demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their due 
process claim regarding a motion to reopen their cases.337 As a result, a
federal district court issued an injunction prohibiting the petitioners’ de-
portation until seven days “after the BIA rule[d] on a timely motion to
reopen.”338 Although the court had no occasion for opining whether 
OSUP amounted to a protected liberty interest, it did note that adjacent
328. OSUPs are analogous to parole in the criminal legal system, and release on one’s
own recognizance is essentially no-bail release. See Parole, Cornell L. Sch., Legal Info. Inst.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parole [https://perma.cc/T6NU-57AB] (last visited July 
26, 2021) (describing parole as “conditional release of prisoners before they complete their 
sentence”); Release on One’s Own Recognizance, Cornell L. Sch., Legal Info. Inst., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/release_on_one%27s_own_recognizance [https://perma.cc/8FGE-
AFEP] (last visited July 26, 2021) (describing release on one’s own recognizance as the prac-
tice of a court releasing a defendant pending trial without bail). 
329. See Miller, supra note 321.
330. 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289–90 (D. Mass. 2018).
331. Id. at 290.
332. Id. at 290–91.
333. Id. at 291.
 334. Id. 
335. Id. at 290; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018) (“[T]he Attorney General may 
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or 
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s . . . religion.”). 
336. Devitri, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 290.
337. Id. at 295.
338. Id. at 298.
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statutory and constitutional rights remain unafected by a grant of 
OSUP.339 
4. The Significance of Shadow Sanctions. — These shadow sanctions are, 
for the most part, enshrouded in secrecy. Absent a FOIA request, detailed
information about when and how many reprieves are granted is unavaila-
ble.340 But if there are at least eleven million deportable noncitizens in the 
United States currently, and one million have been ordered removed but
are on OSUPs, three-quarters of a million have DACA, nearly 90,000 had 
their cases closed due to low-priority status, and tens of thousands are 
shielded by other measures, a sizeable share of the deportable population 
has received a punishment other than deportation for their status as a re-
movable noncitizen.341 Shadow sanctions merit much more attention than 
they have received so far. 
All of this demonstrates that the government possesses tools at various
points in the enforcement process to implicitly prioritize cases, deciding
to pursue some but not others. Prioritization reveals qualitative judgments 
about diferent immigration ofenders and ofenses.342 Despite overreli-
ance on the single penalty of deportation in the INA, the INA creates a 
foundation for other discretionary sanctions, which the immigration bu-
reaucracy has defined largely through internal administrative law.343 The
tools discussed above might promote administrative convenience, but they 
also enable DHS to set priorities in enforcement and to rationally distin-
guish among removable immigrants. 
C. Rule of Law Deficits 
As chronicled above, the scheme of shadow sanctions in immigration
enforcement instantiates all sorts of qualitative judgments, largely shielded 
from public scrutiny, about the relative priority of enforcement against var-
ious immigrants. They also produce potential rule of law deficits. The lack
of transparency, a lack of consistent (or any articulated) standards in some
339. Id. at 295 (describing a “statutory right to move to reopen and an entitlement to 
not be deported to a country where persecution would occur” as the basis of petitioners’
due process claim). 
340. See Heeren, supra note 236, at 1120 n.14 (describing ICE data obtained through 
a FOIA request). 
341. See Budiman, supra note 32 (noting that there are currently around eleven million 
undocumented immigrants in the United States); Miller, supra note 321 (noting that over
one million noncitizens have been ordered removed but remain present on supervised re-
lease); Svajlenka & Wolgin, supra note 259 (noting that 825,000 noncitizens have benefited 
from DACA); TRAC, Administrative Closure, supra note 298 (noting cases that were closed
using administrative closure based on their low-priority status). 
342. See supra section II.B.
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instances, and the lack of factual development or evidence-based decisions 
all create the potential for arbitrariness.344 
Although the immigration bureaucracy, like all administrative agen-
cies, enjoys substantial discretion in implementing congressional com-
mands and presidential policy preferences, the Supreme Court has 
confirmed that its policies must not be arbitrary.345 In Judulang v. Holder, 
the Supreme Court invalidated a BIA policy as “arbitrary and capricious” 
when the policy defined eligibility for relief from removal on reasons as
“extraneous to the merits of the case as a coin flip would be.”346 In that 
case, the Court considered a challenge to a BIA policy regarding relief
from removal. Immigrants on the cusp of entry with certain criminal con-
victions are excludable under immigration law, and certain criminal con-
victions also trigger deportability for immigrants already here.347 The INA 
previously ofered relief from exclusion to some immigrants with criminal 
convictions, and the doctrine evolved to require some version of this relief
also to be made available to immigrants facing deportation based on crim-
inal convictions.348 The BIA decided to extend eligibility for relief to de-
portable immigrants based on whether their deportation ground “consists
of a set of crimes ‘substantially equivalent’ to the set of ofenses making up 
an exclusion ground.”349 Absent a sufcient match in the sets of ofenses,
the immigrant would be ineligible.350 
The Court chided the agency for failing to consider any factors relat-
ing to the immigrant’s “fitness to reside in this country.”351 For a policy to
constitute reasoned decisionmaking, it must bear relation “to the purposes 
of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration 
system.”352 Such a connection, however loose, must be evident even with
344. For example, filmmakers working on a documentary about ICE note that the ICE 
agent whom they profiled lacked basic information about targets. When apprehending a 
lawful permanent resident (LPR), the agent had no idea whether the LPR was the bread-
winner for his family, how many children he had, or what immigration status his spouse had. 
Those questions arose only after the agents had apprehended him and placed him in their 
car. See Five Years North (Optimist Films 2021).
345. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53–54 (2011) (“Agencies, the BIA among 
them, have expertise and experience in administering their statutes that no court can 
properly ignore. But courts retain a role . . . in ensuring that agencies have engaged in rea-
soned decisionmaking.”). 
346. Id. at 56.
347. See id. at 46 (referencing criminal grounds that serve as grounds for exclusion and 
deportation). 
348. Id. at 49 (extending the availability of relief from an exclusion proceeding to a
deportation proceeding). 
349. Id. 
350. Id. at 51.
351. Id. at 53.
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respect to discretionary relief for deportable immigrants.353 Although the 
Court did not identify specific factors related to an immigrant’s fitness to
remain, it approvingly noted the BIA’s consideration of a variety of factors 
when determining whether to ultimately award relief to eligible immi-
grants: “the seriousness of the ofense, evidence of either rehabilitation or
recidivism, the duration of the alien’s residence, the impact of deportation 
on the family, the number of citizens in the family, and the character of
any service in the Armed Forces.”354 These factors overlap somewhat with
the tone and content of the Morton Memos described above—they stand 
for the notion that persons posing serious public safety risks should be
priorities for removal, or that the severity of one’s ofense should weigh 
against relief from removal.355 Moreover, both the BIA factors and the 
Morton Memos at least superficially acknowledge the value of U.S. citizen 
family ties, an immigrant’s lengthy residence in the community, and ser-
vice to the nation.356 All of this suggests that such factors are articulable,
even if the immigration bureaucracy has substantial leeway in defining 
them. 
Non-DACA deferred action, administrative closure, and OSUP all lack
adequate articulated standards, and therefore, adequate notice of those 
standards.357 Although the law provides for a range of potential reprieves 
from deportation, few noncitizens have legal counsel in removal proceed-
ings,358 meaning that most noncitizens are unlikely to know about them.
Unsurprisingly, the process of obtaining deferred action has remained 
“opaque.”359 As Wadhia notes, “[T]here is no current form, fee, or public 
information about how to apply except for the DACA program.”360 Simi-
larly, OSUPs have a statutory basis and implementing regulations, but the 
bulk of ICE policy on these orders remains internal, known publicly only 
through Wadhia’s FOIA request.361 Without public criteria, or noncitizens 
353. This reasoning suggests that APA claims might advance deportable immigrants’
well-being better than constitutional rights-based claims. See Ray, Trump v. Hawaii, supra
note 128, at 786–89 (explaining that recent constitutional challenges to executive action in 
immigration law have tended to fail because courts apply rational basis review even amid 
allegations of presidential animus).
354. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 48.
355. See Morton Priority Memo, supra note 222, at 1–3 (listing factors). 
356. Id. 
357. For a discussion of the value of notice in the realm of discretionary reprieves from 
removal, see Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321–24 (2001). 
358. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2015) (finding that, from 2007 to 2012, only
37% of all immigrants secured legal representation).
359. See Wadhia, The Aftermath of United States v. Texas, supra note 23 (describing de-
ferred action as “opaque” outside of DACA).
360. Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization, supra note 22, at 5.
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even knowing of the existence of shadow sanctions, the immigration bu-
reaucracy operates in a zone of arbitrariness. 
Recent eforts to eliminate use of various shadow sanctions highlight 
their crucial role. Purporting to strip enforcement ofcials and IJs of all
discretion by, say, eliminating enforcement priorities or administrative clo-
sure,362 does not actually eliminate discretion; it hides or displaces it.363 
The realities of enforcement mean that enforcement ofcials will always 
have to use their discretion to pursue some ofenders over others. Accord-
ingly, the power to regulate deportation must be subject to a more rational,
durable system of sanctions to satisfy rule of law values. Tools like adminis-
trative closure, post-order forbearance, and deferred action all merit
greater consistency and openness to limit the potential for the arbitrary
exercise of government power. To achieve proportionality, however, the 
immigration bureaucracy requires not only a well-reasoned basis for dis-
tinguishing among deportable immigrants; it also requires understanding
the outcomes of each shadow sanction. For example, how many immi-
grants eventually obtain lawful status after receiving deferred action versus
administrative closure or an OSUP? How long does a noncitizen typically 
live and work in the United States on one of these shadow sanctions? Once 
more empirical information becomes available, we can better understand 
how harsh or lenient a particular shadow sanction is in practice. Only then
does the task of assigning proportionate penalties become possible. 
III. TOWARD REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND PROPORTIONALITY
Although a statutory code that imposes deportation for every ofense
appears consistent, transparent, and nonarbitrary, enforcement realities 
mean only some will be deported, while others receive a shadow sanction 
or none.364 This relatively unregulated possibility for lenience produces
both the potential to rationally distinguish among removable immigrants, 
362. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; 
Administrative Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,491, 52,493 (proposed Aug. 26, 2020). However, a
federal district court enjoined this rule from going into efect. See Centro Legal de la Raza 
v. Exec. Of. for Immigr. Rev., No. 21-cv-00463-SI, 2021 WL 916804, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 
2021) (granting a preliminary injunction based on the plaintifs’ likelihood of success on a
claim that the rule violated the APA).
363. Cf. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big
Data, and Policing, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 15, 30 (2016) (discussing hidden discretion). By
declining to set priorities, and in the absence of more resources for enforcement, the 
Executive devolves that discretion to line ofcers, who then make choices about whom to
apprehend and pursue for removal. As a result, discretion merely migrates to another actor,
but it does not disappear. See Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra 
note 5, at 178 (“Like mass or energy, discretion within complex organizations cannot typi-
cally be destroyed. But the locus of discretion can be shifted.”); Ray, Abdication Through
Enforcement, supra note 214, at 3–4.




   
 





                                                                                                                           





   
    
 
 
2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2095 
and the potential for arbitrariness, featuring the rule of law deficits dis-
cussed above. Where deferred action, administrative closure based on low-
priority status, and OSUP exist (or once existed) as distinct forms of leni-
ence with basis in law (albeit in an underdeveloped form), noncitizens are 
entitled to a reasoned decision on their applications for such lenience.
The principle of proportionality further dictates that the government, in
exercising its enforcement discretion, should do no more harm than it
must to efectuate the purposes of the immigration system,365 even if U.S.
immigration law allows it to. Immigration ofcials should substantiate 
their decisions using specific facts, and reasoned administration ofers a
guiding principle. 
Considering the dim constitutional status of deportable immigrants, 
this Article does not contend that due process requires reforms to promote
reason giving.366 Similarly, given the INA’s displacement of the APA in im-
migration adjudication,367 this Article does not argue that the APA itself 
requires greater notice, consistency, and transparency in the imposition of
shadow sanctions. Instead, this Article ofers prudential reasons for re-
form, grounded principally in the normative value of reasoned administra-
tion, a prerequisite to proportionality. 
A. The Tools of Reasoned Administration
Other areas of administrative regulation, while distinct, ofer lessons
for immigration law. As earlier noted, the challenge of structuring discre-
tion pervades the administrative state, as do opportunities for lenience.368 
Opportunities for lenience are an important part of a regulatory scheme 
because traditional tools for challenging an administrative regulation are 
365. Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 48 (2011) (discussing the arbitrariness of BIA 
policy that drew distinctions without reference to purposes of the immigration system). This
would require government ofcials to identify, articulate, and consider the purposes of the 
immigration system and explain how their enforcement work in specific cases furthers those 
purposes. 
366. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1297 (1975) 
(discussing the lower standard of process due for a “concededly deportable alien” seeking 
discretionary relief). 
367. For example, the APA does not apply to removal proceedings. See Ardestani v.
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991) (describing Congress’s decision to
supersede the APA’s hearing provisions through the INA). In addition, the INA precludes 
judicial review of certain discretionary forms of relief established by statute. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2018). Nonetheless, the APA retains an important role in checking 
exercises of executive discretion, such as the denial of a continuance. See Wadhia, Beyond 
Deportation, supra note 59, at 115–16. 
368. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to 
Administrative Rules, 1982 Duke L.J. 277, 280 (“Administrative equity serves as a bridge 
between collectively determined rules and the reality of the particular case.”).
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often unavailable.369 As a result, many regulatory domains ofer opportu-
nities for lenience. For example, environmental law authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to grant variances
to a known violator of the Safe Drinking Water Act.370 Similarly, the 
Secretary of the Department of Energy has the power to “make ‘adjust-
ments’ to rules of general applicability,” in the form of a declaratory judg-
ment or an advisory opinion.371 As a result, this Article looks across 
substantive areas of regulation for inspiration. 
As immigration law comes to be appreciated as administrative law, it
makes sense to learn how other administrative agencies navigate the 
tradeofs between formality and informality, or rules and discretion, and 
what kind of procedures agencies devise beyond those strictly required by 
the Constitution or the APA (and for what reasons).372 Elizabeth Magill
identifies several possible incentives for agencies to self-regulate.373 First, 
agencies that distribute benefits routinely issue guidelines to produce 
more objective decisionmaking.374 Second, government actors make 
“credible commitments” about future behavior to promote the agency’s 
mission.375 Finally, self-regulation may serve as an important tool to im-
prove internal operations and to produce valuable public goods, such as
information or agency reputation.376 Gillian Metzger observes that agen-
cies voluntarily adopt measures that limit their discretion out of more 
369. Id. at 285–86 (“[I]ndividualized judicial remedies are usually not available, pre-
enforcement judicial review is often too limited, and prosecution is too high a price to pay 
for noncompliance . . . .”). For recent scholarship on administrative equity, see Maggie
Blackhawk, Equity Outside the Courts, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 2037, 2042 (2020) (noting that 
the work of granting exceptions from general rules on account of “unfortunate or unfore-
seen consequences” is “largely done by the courts and the administrative state” rather than 
Congress).
370. Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public Water Systems, U.S. Env’t Prot.
Agency (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/variances-and-exemptions
[https://perma.cc/4LUZ-FNZ9]. 
371. Aman, supra note 368, at 286.
372. Jill E. Family, DAPA and the Future of Immigration Law as Administrative Law, 55
Washburn L.J. 89, 89 (2015) (arguing that the litigation over DAPA has demonstrated the
need to recognize the applicability of mainstream administrative law principles to immigra-
tion law). 
373. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 861 (2009)
(describing the need to understand the consequences of agency self-regulation as “what an
agency can accomplish by self-regulating, and hence why it might do so”).
374. Id. at 867.
375. Id. at 871. Magill ofers the example of the government’s commitment to respect 
contract and property rights in the future, to “induce investment by private parties and fos-
ter economic growth.” Id.
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“basic contemporary normative commitments with respect to how govern-
ment should operate.”377 
The immigration bureaucracy could potentially recognize and re-
spond to some of these incentives. In an immigration system that consists
of a benefits-granting component that views immigrants as “clients” as well 
as an enforcement branch that views removable immigrants as “targets,” 
the agency leadership could benefit from attending to both missions, fa-
cilitating lawful migration, and not simply sanctioning those lacking lawful
status. An indiscriminate or inhumane approach to enforcement poten-
tially deters lawful migration as well.378 President Obama encouraged de-
portable immigrants to come out of the shadows and make their presence 
known in exchange for a sanction short of deportation, at least temporar-
ily.379 By giving deportable immigrants an opportunity to exhibit law-abid-
ing conduct and taking a benefits-granting approach to a subset of the 
deportable population, the Obama Administration enhanced both mis-
sions. In addition, the immigration bureaucracy has a reputation problem, 
one that predates President Trump but that only intensified through the 
indiscriminate enforcement of his administration.380 Although scholars
have suggested that DHS pays a political cost for any perceived nonen-
forcement,381 it turns out that it also pays a political cost for perceived over-
enforcement.382 For example, public opinion decisively favors not merely 
shielding DACA recipients from deportation but providing them with le-
gal status;383 communities ofer sanctuary to deportable immigrants in
377. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common
Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 510 (2010); see also William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, 
A Republic of Statutes 1–2 (2010) (describing “small ‘c’ constitutionalism” as “a modality
of public life and discourse, facilitating the building and editing of structures within which
we as citizens can live flourishing lives”).
378. The Trump Administration also actively eroded legal immigration pathways, turn-
ing lawful presence into unlawful presence. See Amanda Holpuch, How Trump’s ‘Invisible 
Wall’ Policies Have Already Curbed Immigration, Guardian (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/15/invisible-wall-trump-policies-have-curbed-immigration 
[https://perma.cc/H53L-EM5V].
379. An anti-immigration President, however, easily undermines those incentives toward 
reform; the Trump Administration specifically sought to crater lawful immigration and 
spread fear among deportable immigrants. Id.
380. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Abolish ICE Movement Explained, Brennan 
Ctr. for Just. (July 30, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/ 
abolish-ice-movement-explained [https://perma.cc/Z2D7-9VDV] (noting “outrage” fol-
lowing the uptick in ICE arrests under the Trump Administration). 
381. See Cuéllar, supra note 196, at 51.
382. Indeed, indiscriminate enforcement under the Trump Administration prompted 
calls to abolish ICE as a standalone agency. See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 380. 
383. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Americans Broadly Support Legal Status for Immigrants 
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their midst;384 and neighbors form human chains to prevent ICE agents
from apprehending one of their own.385 If reasoned immigration admin-
istration became the norm, broad swaths of the public might hold DHS in
more esteem. For all these reasons, the immigration bureaucracy could 
have the incentive to pursue prudential reform, despite potential costs. 
1. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking. — Agencies have at times estab-
lished legislative rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking to con-
strain enforcement discretion and promote consistency. In Discretionary
Justice, Kenneth Culp Davis emphasized the due process values central to
discretionary justice: openness386 and consistency.387 Openness guards 
against arbitrariness by exposing enforcement ofcials’ judgments to pub-
lic scrutiny. In theory, this promotes accountability and robs them of a se-
cret space of whimsy or vendetta. Consistency also guards against 
arbitrariness by encouraging enforcement ofcials to treat like cases alike,
whether in granting a benefit or imposing a burden.388 Although not un-
alloyed virtues, openness and consistency have greater urgency with re-
spect to enforcement against noncitizens, who lack voting rights,389 which 
are conceived of as one of the traditional checks on government power
and the basis for theorizing about majoritarian consent. 
Davis applied his insights equally to the power to show lenience and 
the power to punish, thereby encompassing the kinds of discretionary re-
prieves at issue in so many areas of administration.390 In his view, “Logically, 
discretionary power to favor an individual cannot exist without discretion-
ary power not to favor him.”391 In other words, he argues that sanctions
and reprieves are two sides of the same coin. Concern for the dangers of
384. Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 Minn.
L. Rev. 1209, 1211 (2019) (describing new forms of sanctuary that have emerged, including 
protective action taken by employers, universities, and other actors). For a discussion of the 
types of state and local sanctuary policies that seek to insulate undocumented immigrants
from immigration enforcement, see Ava Ayers, Missing Immigrants in the Rhetoric of
Sanctuary, 2021 Wis. L. Rev. 473, 486–97.
385. Julia Jacobo, Tennessee Neighbors Form Human Chain to Prevent ICE From
Arresting Father in Driveway, ABC News (July 23, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
tennessee-neighbors-form-human-chain-prevent-ice-arresting/story?id=64508277 [https://
perma.cc/4TL5-U6FY] (describing neighbors’ human chain). 
386. Davis, supra note 27, at 98 (“Openness is the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a
natural ally in the fight against injustice.”). 
387. Cf. id. at 170 (“[T]he question of what is justice in any particular case may not be
determined by considering only the one case but must be determined in the light of what is 
done in comparable cases.”).
388. See Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 995, 996 (2005) 
(connecting consistency to “the integrity of legal systems under the idea of the rule of law”).
389. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (1938) (articulating the
“insular minorities” rationale); see also 18 U.S.C. § 611 (2000) (severely limiting a nonciti-
zen’s right to vote in a federal election). 
390. Davis, supra note 27, at 172.
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selective enforcement drove Davis’s recommendation that agencies make
greater use of rulemaking.392 Accordingly, scholars have cast notice-and-
comment rulemaking as “the best method for making general policy.”393 
Considering this reasoning, scholars have argued for greater use of 
legislative rules to constrain agency discretion in setting penalties.394 For 
example, Wadhia has argued for greater use of rulemaking to structure 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law,395 and with respect to de-
ferred action specifically.396 Legislative rules establish a binding norm.397 
They also ofer clear guidance to enforcement ofcials and law for federal 
courts to apply when reviewing an agency’s compliance with its own 
rules.398 Wadhia argues that internal guidance can provide enough appli-
cable law to evaluate a denial of deferred action.399 But federal judges dis-
agree about the reviewability of decisions governed by internal
guidance.400 Accordingly, legislative rules ofer a clearer path to judicial
review than internal guidance. 
Although agencies might be reluctant to limit their own discretion
through legislative rules, it is possible for them to do so. For example, 
NHTSA promulgated a rule that committed the agency to grant a petition
to commence proceedings upon finding a “‘reasonable possibility’ of a 
392. Id. 
393. Bressman, supra note 139, at 543; Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,
supra note 227, at 279.
394. Calls for rulemaking extend beyond immigration law. In his study of administrative
sanctions imposed by the SEC, Fredrich H. Thomforde, Jr. argued that administrative agen-
cies should explore possibilities for constraining discretion in the issuance of sanctions 
against ofenders. Frederich H. Thomforde, Jr., Controlling Administrative Sanctions, 74
Mich. L. Rev. 709, 758 (1976). Given the impossibility of legislative rules contemplating 
every combination of factors that a given ofense might present, Thomforde noted the in-
evitable role for agency discretion to ensure a fit between the ofense and the sanction. Id. 
at 716; see also Sherry Lynn Peel, Administrative Law and Procedure, 19 Tex. Tech L. Rev.
223, 241 (1988). This vast power to “impose sanctions upon a regulated person found to 
have violated relevant standards of conduct” has gone largely unchecked. Thomforde, su-
pra, at 710. As a result, agency rulemaking, while helpful, does not eliminate the danger of 
arbitrariness in sanctions.
395. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 294–99.
396. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. Rev. 1, 60 (2012) (recommending that de-
ferred action be published as a rule). 
397. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing “man-
datory, definitive language” suggesting that the policy was a substantive rule and binding
norm); see also William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro & Russell L. Weaver, Administrative
Procedure and Practice: A Contemporary Approach 352 (6th ed. 2018) (“According to the
court, a rule is legislative if it is binding on an agency, regardless of whether it is also binding
on regulated entities.”). 
398. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 279.
399. See Wadhia, Beyond Deportation, supra note 59, at 131–32.
400. See, e.g., Morales de Soto v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying
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safety-related defect in the manufacturers’ cars.”401 The D.C. Circuit held
that the “reasonable possibility” standard constituted law for the court to
apply, bringing the agency’s decision out of the zone of unreviewable dis-
cretion described in Heckler v. Chaney.402 The NHTSA rule illustrates that 
agencies can use legislative rules to limit their own discretion. 
Legislative rules, however, involve tradeofs. Converting shadow sanc-
tions into clear rules for penalizing deportable immigrants would promote 
consistency but could potentially undermine agency incentives to provide
shadow sanctions in the first place.403 Pressure on agencies to centralize
and standardize enforcement discretion by adopting legislative rules could 
then render the agency vulnerable to litigation over its compliance with
those rules.404 If the agency declines to formalize its own internal adminis-
trative law, a court might nonetheless interpret its guidance as a legislative 
rule that violated procedural requirements for its adoption—ruling, essen-
tially, that it should have adopted the rule via notice-and-comment rule-
making.405 Finally, if an agency seeks to avoid these outcomes, it could
adopt “less specific, less decisive, and less clear” guidance.406 But, as Gillian
Metzger and Kevin Stack reason, these undermine internal administrative 
law.407 Pressuring agencies to promulgate standards for deferred action, 
OSUP, and the like—especially through rulemaking—would increase 
costs, trigger judicial review, and lead the agency to drastically reduce its
willingness or ability to impose sanctions less than deportation. For that
reason, imposing a requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
might prove too costly. 
Transparency also threatens to thwart enforcement. In the realm of
environmental law, for example, transparency in sanctions often runs
counter to the agency’s objective. The EPA has a penalty policy to guide 
diferent enforcement regions.408 That policy emphasizes secrecy: It in-
structs ofcials that the “deterrence” figure that the agency computes as
401. 49 C.F.R. § 552.8 (1987); see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 801
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the regulation).
402. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 828 F.2d at 803 (noting that the regulation provided “law to 
apply”). 
403. Cf. Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI
v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 131, 156 (1992) (noting that “an agency
bent on doing its work outside of judicial review and formal procedures will often find a way 
to evade many of the well-intentioned ‘external’ restrictions on its discretion by resorting to
even more informal and nonpublic processes for its decisionmaking”).
404. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 24, at 1279.
405. See id. at 1281.
406. Id. at 1288.
407. See id. (“[T]o the extent that agencies craft their internal law to avoid judicial
cognizance, this doctrine undermines the capacity of internal administrative law to serve its 
political, managerial and legal accountability roles.”). 
408. See U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, A Framework for Status-Specific Approaches to Penalty 
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its desired penalty—which the agency sets internally “as a goal at the outset
of settlement negotiations”—should generally not be revealed to the of-
fender.409 Similarly, commentators have argued that transparency sur-
rounding categorical nonenforcement in tax essentially legalizes entire 
sets of tax violations.410 Likewise, if ICE ofcers informed noncitizens in
removal proceedings of shadow sanctions, making deportable immigrants 
aware that they will not be deported, it could diminish the deterrent efect 
of each apprehension.411 
Finally, one might worry that greater procedural requirements will 
lead an agency to phase out shadow sanctions as not worth the trouble, 
reducing the production of internal law and fueling unchecked enforce-
ment.412 Although successful administration—both efective and hu-
mane—requires a mix of formality and informality, rules and standards,
and centralization and decentralization, the realities of immigration en-
forcement do not support this feared gutting of shadow sanctions. 
Congressional appropriations for enforcement have risen steadily since 
DHS was created in 2003.413 From a combined CBP–ICE budget of $9.6 
billion in fiscal year 2003, appropriations have grown to $25.3 billion in 
fiscal year 2020.414 But as is often quoted, “only” about 400,000 of the 
eleven million deportable noncitizens can be removed annually.415 The 
agency simply cannot execute removals at any greater scale, and the notion
that the government will substitute deportation for OSUPs, deferred ac-
tion, and such has more theoretical than practical purchase. In theory, the 
agency could simply leave deportable immigrants living under orders of




410. Cf. Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 Tax L. Rev. 73, 
80 (2015) (discussing a scholarly critique of “customary deviations,” through which the IRS 
“acquiesces in widespread noncompliance”). But see id. at 131 (defending the legitimacy
of categorical nonenforcement on the grounds of accountability, deliberation, and
nonarbitrariness). 
411. See Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 233
(“Generally speaking, when an ofense can be committed in multiple ways or in multiple
places, publicizing who or what law enforcement ofcials will be looking for can make it
easier for would-be violators to avoid detection.”). 
412. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 291 (discuss-
ing David Martin’s argument that judicial review can depress agency policymaking); see also 
Metzger & Stack, supra note 24, at 1288 (“The more clearly internal law constrains the
agency’s discretion, the greater the risk of procedural invalidation for not employing notice
and comment or of external judicial enforcement.”). 
413. Am. Immigr. Council, supra note 191.
 414. Id. 
415. Dara Lind, Obama Is Deporting More Immigrants Than Any President in History:
Explained, Vox (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/4/9/5575006/2-million-
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work authorization. This is the real danger, especially if the President seeks
to induce “self-deportation.”416 Even if an administration retains shadow
sanctions amid greater procedural requirements, the agency might lose 
the incentive to say much about shadow sanctions if it will be used against
them subsequently in court.417 
2. Interpretive Guidance and Centralized Discretion. — The principal al-
ternative to legislative rules is interpretive guidance,418 which is “not sup-
posed to have the force of law.”419 Interpretive guidance allows agencies 
flexibility in articulating general statements of policy or managing internal
operations.420 Enforcement guidelines often take the form of interpretive
guidance.421 Guidance documents ofer another avenue for mitigating 
rule of law deficits without the costs associated with greater formalization. 
The immigration enforcement bureaucracy has relied on interpretive 
guidance throughout its history, but the quality of guidance issued has var-
ied. For instance, the Morton Memos provided guidance to line ofcers 
on enforcement priorities and equitable factors, and many commentators
praised the memos for explicitly articulating priorities.422 Ultimately, how-
ever, the guidance proved too vague on key questions and notoriously dif-
ficult to enforce against wayward line ofcers.423 These deficiencies fueled
calls for better, more precise guidance (or even resort to rulemaking).424 
416. See K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 Harv. L. Rev., 1878, 1880–82 (2019)
(defining self-deportation and describing government eforts to induce self-deportation). 
417. See Chen, Administrator-in-Chief, supra note 266, at 423 (noting perverse incen-
tives of demanding more procedure). 
418. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018) (exempting “general statements of policy” and 
“interpretive rules” from rulemaking procedure). 
419. Blake Emerson & Ronald M. Levin, Opinion, Interpretive Rules in Practice, Regul. 
Rev. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/30/emerson-levin-
interpretive-rules-practice/ [https://perma.cc/XR24-DC5Y]. 
420. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1441 (1992) (describing policymaking through “policy state-
ments, interpretive rules, and guidance documents” as an option that “would maximize the 
agency’s flexibility to change its mind and to amend its policy in the future by merely chang-
ing its policy or interpretation in the same spontaneous way it first issued the policy”).
421. See Magill, supra note 373, at 866 n.9 (collecting scholarship discussing enforce-
ment guidelines but noting a lack of “systematic discussion or analysis”); id. at 886 (describ-
ing how self-regulation constrains line ofcers’ discretion).
422. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 
224, at 186–87; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigr. Pol’y Ctr., The Morton Memo and 
Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview 3 (2011), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil. 
org/sites/default/files/research/Shoba_-_Prosecutorial_Discretion_072011_0.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/9HM7-LXSC] (praising the Morton Memos). 
423. See Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 224, at 688 (characterizing DACA
and DAPA as a “managerial strategy to overcome resistance by frontline Executive Branch 
employees” in contrast to mere enforcement priorities that call for “open-ended balancing 
of factors” by front line ofcers).
424. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 227, at 286 (arguing that 



































2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2103 
For example, the Morton Memos prioritized deportation of nonciti-
zens posing risks to “public safety,” but some line ofcers interpreted this
to cover minor crimes.425 After all, reasonable people can difer in what
they regard as a threat to “public safety,”426 and ICE enforcement culture
was already biased toward apprehension and deportation of all deportable 
immigrants.427 As a result, the Morton Memos had only a limited impact,
if at all, on patterns of enforcement.428 This ultimately led DHS leadership
to centralize discretion across the agency, culminating in President Obama
announcing DACA.429 
Other agencies also use guidance rather than legislative rules to guide 
enforcement discretion.430 For example, the EPA promulgated a policy
statement establishing incentives for self-policing of environmental viola-
tions.431 Specifically, the agency promised not to seek “gravity-based penal-
ties for violations of Federal environmental requirements discovered and 
disclosed by the entity.”432 It also promised not to recommend a regulated
entity for criminal prosecution under specified circumstances.433 Moreo-
ver, the policy exempted certain ofenders from environmental audits.434 
The policy evinced the agency’s willingness to limit its discretion in inves-
tigating and penalizing ofenders in exchange for self-disclosure of
violations.435 
Similarly, the EPA headquarters has produced a robust corpus of in-
terpretive guidance on civil penalties436 that still guides all ten regional
425. See Wadhia, Reading the Morton Memo, supra note 256, at 5 (noting ICE’s “long 
history” of interpreting dangerousness under enforcement priorities “beyond its ordinary
meaning”).
426. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 173 (not-
ing that “political ofcials outside of ICE might not have considered an immigrant cited
for . . . [a DUI as] a public safety threat, but an ICE agent almost certainly would have”).
427. Id. (discussing the ICE union president’s testimony before Congress suggesting
that enforcement priorities required ICE agents to “knowingly fail to enforce the law”). 
428. Id. at 170 (noting internal agency data, obtained through a FOIA request, “reveals
no immediate changes in arrest patterns” following the issuance of the Morton Memos).
429. See id. at 174 (noting that President Obama’s immigration initiative aimed to help
secure the presence of certain young people in the United States).
430. Joseph F. Guida & Jean M. Flores, From Here to a Penalty: Anatomy of EPA Civil
Administrative Enforcement, 43 Tex. Env’t L.J. 129, 146 (2013) (“Rather than developing
regulations to implement these instructions, EPA has issued penalty policies intended to 
give the public notice of EPA’s internal eforts to follow these statutory mandates.”). 
431. Robert V. Percival, Christopher H. Schroeder, Alan S. Miller & James P. Leape, 
Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 1076 (7th ed. 2013).




436. General Civil Enforcement Penalty Policies, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.
epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-policy-guidance-publications#models [https://perma.cc
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ofces.437 Unlike ICE field ofces that operate relatively autonomously, 
EPA regional ofces are expected to follow national guidance.438 The EPA
also issues interpretive guidance to structure and constrain equitable 
decisionmaking regarding, for example, variances and exemptions from 
its principal statutes.439 This helps the public understand the scope of
equitable remedies and the rationale underlying them. 
More or better interpretive guidance could help immigration en-
forcement agencies fulfill their mission. The OSUP program, for example, 
sufers from a lack of standards and priorities, which undermines the su-
pervision of noncitizens ordered removed.440 An Ofce of the Inspector
General report in April 2017 found that ICE failed to adequately supervise 
those noncitizens granted OSUP, mainly due to inadequate stafng.441 The 
report found that, in four field ofces, the average number of cases involv-
ing nondetained immigrants per deportation ofcer varied widely. In the 
Seattle, Washington field ofce, that number was 1,720 per ofcer, but in
Washington, D.C., it was over 10,000.442 In addition to poor stafng, the 
agency had not “clearly and widely communicated Department priorities
for deportation to [deportation ofcers]; not issued up-to-date, compre-
hensive, and accessible procedures for supervising aliens; and not pro-
vided sufcient training.”443 This led to inadequate supervision. For 
example, deportation ofcers sometimes lacked basic information essen-
tial to implementing OSUPs, such as news that a noncitizen had relocated
to their region and that their field ofce was now responsible for supervis-
ing them.444 Sometimes they were unaware of a supervisee’s criminal his-
tory.445 Instead of ramping up stafng in an already expensive agency,
reforms could infuse deportation ofcers’ work with priorities, concentrat-
ing on improving information and focusing deportation ofcers’ attention 
on those cases warranting the most intensive supervision. As this example 
illustrates, the lack of current, comprehensive guidance potentially harms
437. Regional and Geographic Ofces, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/regional-and-geographic-offices [https://perma.cc/JS3B-RFVZ] (last updated July
9, 2021).
 438. See id.
439. See Water Quality Standards Variances, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.
gov/wqs-tech/water-quality-standards-variances [https://perma.cc/Y6JF-CQCT] (last up-
dated Sept. 3, 2021).
440. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Of. of the Inspector Gen., OIG-17-51, ICE 
Deportation Operations 6 (2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/ 
2017/OIG-17-51-Apr17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TLK-GEDJ]. 
441. Id. at 3.
442. Id. at 4.
443. Id. at 3.
444. Id. at 7.
445. Id. at 8 (“Without checking on criminal history, [deportation ofcers] may be un-
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noncitizens but also undermines the agency’s objective. Self-interest could 
induce the agency to produce more and better guidance. 
Apart from better guidance, centralization also cultivates consistency, 
an important rule of law value and safeguard against arbitrariness.446 Just 
as opportunities for lenience appear at diferent points in the enforce-
ment process, so too do the opportunities to adjudicate reside in diferent 
parts of the enforcement bureaucracy. USCIS, for example, evaluates ap-
plications for deferred action for individuals not in removal proceed-
ings.447 But ERO ofcers evaluate requests for OSUPs,448 and IJs or the BIA
grant or deny administrative closure.449 Multiple agencies with distinctive
institutional cultures and competencies draw qualitative distinctions 
among deportable immigrants every day. USCIS adjudicates benefits,450 
whereas ERO apprehends, detains, and removes deportable immigrants.451 
EOIR similarly has an enforcement orientation, as it is housed in DOJ and 
oversees removal proceedings and appeals.452 In adjudicating claims for 
lenience at diferent points in the enforcement process, centralization
could have advantages. Specifically, centralized guidance from high-level 
ofcials at DHS and DOJ regarding the factors supporting a favorable ex-
ercise of discretion could help promote consistency across these diferent
institutional cultures.453 
Agency design shapes the efcacy of interpretive guidance. For exam-
ple, commentators have observed the Obama Administration’s greater
success in implementing priorities by assigning responsibility for 
adjudicating DACA applications to USCIS, the benefits-granting arm of
DHS.454 ICE’s rank and file resented the Morton Memos and chafed under 
446. See Chen, Administrator-in-Chief, supra note 266, at 426.
447. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 239. Wadhia notes that, prior to 2012, ICE
granted deferred action to several hundred noncitizens already in removal proceedings, but 
data on these cases are sparse. Wadhia, Beyond Deportation, supra note 59, at 74–75.
448. Phil Kuck, OSUP: The Grim Reality of Orders of Supervision, Kuck Baxter Immigr. 
(May 10, 2019), https://www.immigration.net/2019/05/10/osup-the-grim-reality-of-orders
-of-supervision/ [https://perma.cc/Y7KM-LX5R]. 
449. Montano, supra note 267, at 567.
450. Chapter 1—Purpose and Background, Policy Manual, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-b-chapter-1 [https://perma.cc 
/JF5E-656T] (last updated Aug. 12, 2021) (describing USCIS’s role in adjudicating immi-
gration benefit requests).
451. Enforcement and Removal Operations, supra note 185.
452. About the Ofce, supra note 169.
453. See Chen, Administrator-in-Chief, supra note 266, at 353 (noting the “three C’s— 
coherency, consistency, and coordination—are the internal tasks of administration . . . inex-
tricably related to the success and efectiveness of policies”). 
454. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 224, at
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President Obama’s more rule-like limits on enforcement.455 Accordingly, 
the Administration shifted responsibility for the exercise of favorable 
discretion. Similarly, the initial granting of an OSUP might properly reside 
with ICE, which makes custody determinations, but higher-level agency 
guidance from DHS’s leadership on priorities applicable to all DHS 
subunits could help improve the procedure and substance of decisions
regarding OSUPs.456 EOIR is not part of DHS, and thus, high-level
interpretive guidance from DHS will not apply to IJs. But the more unified
a voice with which DHS speaks, the more the message will be heard across 
the bureaucracy. More and better interpretive guidance is sorely needed. 
The absence of robust interpretive guidance in immigration law possibly 
follows from the agency’s desire not to admit that it does not deport all
deportable immigrants. 
Outside of immigration law, scholars have touted the benefits of “cen-
tralized instruction” of agency personnel, as inconsistency across regional 
ofces could produce unfairness.457 To guard against this result, agencies
publish staf manuals to “regulariz[e] employee action.”458 For example, 
OSHA publishes a reference manual to establish enforcement guidelines 
for its inspectors.459 Conceivably, the same could be done through coordi-
nation among leaders of diferent agencies within the immigration 
bureaucracy.
3. Procedural Innovation to Promote Reason Giving. — Short of agency 
rulemaking or better interpretive guidance, however, the immigration bu-
reaucracy should create opportunities for reason giving to promote line 
ofcers’ and adjudicators’ ability to draw meaningful distinctions among
removable immigrants. Examples of procedural innovation across the ad-
ministrative state abound,460 and other jurisdictions like the European 
455. See Kagan, Binding the Enforcers, supra note 224, at 685 (discussing the frag-
mented structure of DHS that ensures “aggressive immigration enforcement from one pres-
idential administration to the next,” constraining presidential discretion). 
456. The Ofce of the Inspector General’s report on OSUP revealed that deportation 
ofcers struggled with their vast and varied workload, which included “working with embas-
sies and consulates to obtain travel documents necessary for deportation,” running criminal 
background checks, and interviewing noncitizens under supervision. Of. of the Inspector 
Gen., supra note 440, at 4.
457. See Funk et al., supra note 397, at 342 (noting the “widely dispersed regional of-
fices” of most agencies and how “[a]bsent centralized instruction, these diferent ofces 
could develop diferent responses to similar problems,” and consequently, “politically re-




460. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee’s
White Space, 32 J. Land Use & Env’t L. 523, 533 (2017) (“In recent decades, however, courts
and scholars have increasingly understood the APA . . . as a skeletal framework that leaves
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Union ofer insights for promoting reasoned administration as well as pro-
portionality.461 Meaningful reform would encourage line ofcers to gather 
facts, analyze evidence, and articulate reasons in support of a judgment,
however informal.462 In the aggregate, such interpretive guidance could
also have an educative function in society when slogans and conclusory 
arguments dominate public discourse.463 Supplying more factual analysis 
and reasoning could introduce desperately needed nuance Congress has
not provided.
Notable examples of procedural innovation that promote reason giv-
ing appear across the administrative state. Famously, for example, the FDA 
subjects its interpretive guidance to a public commenting process—one 
not required by the APA or other authority.464 Similarly, scholars in immi-
gration law have called for greater public input on enforcement priorities 
outside of an ofcial notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure.465 
Centralized enforcement priorities promote consistency, but meaningful 
feedback would most likely be obtained from the public. For example, a
nonenforcement unit of DHS, such as DHS’s Ofce for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties466 could convene a committee of stakeholders, including,
for example, representatives from immigrant communities, labor unions, 
461. See Mashaw, Reasoned Administration, supra note 160, at 101 (discussing “the
right to reasons and the practice of administrative reason giving” in the European Union 
and the United States). 
462. See Rochel, supra note 137, at 101 (“[T]he main objective is to force the public 
authority to interact transparently with the affected person in order to secure this person
enough information to be able to understand, reconstruct, and perhaps contest a decision.”).
463. Cf. Alise Coen, Opinion, Changes in US Immigration Conversation Signal 
Departure From Responsibility Sharing, Globe Post (June 24, 2019), https://theglobepost. 
com/2019/06/24/us-immigration-conversation/ [https://perma.cc/3L7C-TBTT] (noting 
shifting political rhetoric in the Trump Administration that placed blame on Mexico and 
Central American countries for unauthorized migration).
464. See, e.g., Oversight of Clinical Investigations—A Risk-Based Approach to Monitoring,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/
search-fda-guidance-documents/oversight-clinical-investigations-risk-based-approach-moni 
toring/ [https://perma.cc/6DZ3-GL52]; see also Jill E. Family, Easing the Guidance Document
Dilemma Agency by Agency: Immigration Law and Not Really Binding Rules, 47 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 1, 15–16 (2013) (describing USCIS practice of soliciting public comments on 
draft policy memoranda). In October 2019, President Trump issued an executive order re-
quiring federal agencies to “take public input into account when appropriate in formulating 
guidance documents,” but he exempted DHS from this requirement without explanation. 
See Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9, 2019). President Biden subse-
quently rescinded this order. See Exec. Order No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 7049 (Jan. 20, 2021).
465. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 224, at
219 (“Some form of public input into the development of enforcement priorities with more
formality than private meetings convened by the Executive and less than notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking would be a valuable contribution . . . .”).
466. Ofce for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
https://www.dhs.gov/ofce-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties/ [https://perma.cc/7G25-9MYG] 
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the Chamber of Commerce, hospitals, police, schools, faith-based institu-
tions, and other civic organizations to seek input on enforcement patterns, 
priorities, and community concerns.467 
Prudential reason giving takes many forms. Consider the SEC no-action
letter, which provides a nonbinding legal opinion to an entity contemplat-
ing a transaction that might be prohibited by law.468 The agency issues these
letters (among a host of informal avenues for giving advice)469 to educate
regulated parties and induce deliberation among SEC staff attorneys.470 The
SEC issues these opinions to mitigate public confusion about an intricate 
statutory scheme and to further its mission.471 Donna Nagy notes that “ef-
fective capital formation and the success of the securities markets depend 
on public confidence in issuers, financial institutions, and market profes-
sionals.”472 No-action letters facilitate the public’s understanding.
Similarly, decisions on various shadow sanctions could take the form of a 
“no imminent removal” letter. These letters could inform deportable immi-
grants of the agency’s assessment of each individual in the scheme of priorities
for deportation. These letters could be made available (redacted for nonciti-
zens’ privacy) in a searchable database to educate noncitizens and the public
and to induce deliberation and consistency among line officers.473 Ultimately, 
467. Executive orders can induce agency consultation with stakeholders as well. Cf. 
Metzger & Stack, supra note 24, at 1302 (discussing executive orders that require agencies 
to consult with state, local, and tribal ofcials before imposing regulations afecting those 
entities). One question that warrants further analysis is whether this kind of advisory body 
would trigger the Federal Advisory Committee Act and its associated requirements, includ-
ing public meetings. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1, 10 (2019).
468. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 924 (1998) 
(describing no-action letters as “informal and advisory”).
469. These include “face-to-face meetings or telephone conversations between SEC staf
members and securities law practitioners; . . . staf letters commenting on filed material;  . . .
speeches and presentations at professional conferences; [and] congressional testimony.” Id. 
at 935.
470. See id. at 934–35 (explaining why the SEC ofers informal advice to the public).
471. Id. at 934.
 472. Id. 
473. Such a database of decisions could be used alongside guidance documents to create
an evolving, flexible source of guidance. See, e.g., Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Administrative
Conference Recommendation 2017-5: Agency Guidance Through Policy Statements 8 (Dec.
14, 2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202017-
5%20%28Agency%20Guidance%20Through%20Policy%20Statements%29_2.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/QL72-J4Z9] (recommending that agencies make “flexible use of policy statements in
a manner that still takes due account of needs for consistency and predictability”). The
Administrative Conference of the United States recommends, “[W]hen the agency accepts a 
proposal for a lawful approach other than that put forward in a policy statement and the ap-
proach seems likely to be applicable to other situations, the agency should disseminate its de-
cision and the reasons for it to other persons who might make the argument, to other affected
stakeholders, to officials likely to hear the argument, and to members of the public.” Id.; see
also Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,734 (Dec. 29, 2017) (“[F]lexible
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procedural innovation should promote the analysis of facts and evidence.
DHS has created and maintained a vast and costly surveillance system,474 
making the dearth of information provided to deportable immigrants and the 
broader public about the agency’s reasoning (if any) simply striking. The 
norm of reasoned administration requires more. 
As noted previously, reasoned administration has potential practical 
shortcomings and faces structural obstacles.475 Imposing duties to analyze and 
deliberate would likely increase the costs of enforcement.476 Depending on 
how immigration enforcement officials interpret their mission, they might re-
gard increased regulations as thwarting the goals of enforcement.477 Incen-
tives to adopt reform might be weak, again, especially if enforcement officials 
interpret their mission to be the removal of all deportable immigrants.478 Until
use of policy statements may also be helpful with respect to agencies’ use of interpretive
rules.”); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical
Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 Yale J. Reg. 165, 241–44 (2019) (proposing a regime of 
“principled flexibility” in agency use of policy statements to create a “rationally evolving prec-
edent that informs future decisions about [requests to depart from agency guidance]”).
474. For a discussion of the early border patrol’s vast surveillance eforts, see 
Hernández, supra note 175, at 53.
475. See supra section I.A.1.
476. See supra section III.A.1.
477. See, e.g., Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Takes ‘Shackles’ Off ICE, Which Is
Slapping Them on Immigrants Who Thought They Were Safe, Wash. Post (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-takes-shackles-off-ice-which-is 
-slapping-them-on-immigrants-who-thought-they-were-safe/2018/02/11/4bd5c164-083a-11e8-
b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Trump officials’
characterization of more indiscriminate enforcement as “taking ‘the shackles off’” ICE agents). 
478. See id. However, developments in the early months of the Biden Administration sug-
gest that leadership can induce change. For example, after the Biden Administration an-
nounced new enforcement priorities, ICE launched a new “case review” process in early 2021
to allow detained immigrants to argue that they are no longer an enforcement priority. See
Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, ICE’s New Case Review Process Lets Immigrants Appeal Detention 
and Deportation, Immigr. Impact (Mar. 9, 2021), https://immigrationimpact.com/2021/03/
09/ice-case-review-process-2021/#.YNSgmOhKiUk [https://perma.cc/E7YA-ZN3Y]. Similarly,
the Principal Legal Advisor for DHS issued interim guidance to all Office of the Principal Legal
Advisor (OPLA) attorneys to identify and describe opportunities for the exercise of discretion
at every stage of the enforcement process. Memorandum from John D. Trasviña, Principal
Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, to All OPLA Attorneys (May 27, 2021), https:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_interim-guidance.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W53E-RH2H]. But implementation of this guidance remains “spotty.”
Dara Lind, Immigration Prosecutors Were Told Not to Push for Deportation in Cases Like His.
He Was Ordered Deported the Next Day., ProPublica (July 27, 2021), https://www.propublica.
org/article/immigration-prosecutors-were-told-not-to-push-for-deportation-in-cases-like-his?u 
tm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dailynewsletter&utm_content=fea 
ture [https://perma.cc/5KBL-RHMV] (describing ICE’s pursuit of “exactly the sorts of depor-
tation cases” the new guidance sought to prevent). News reports indicate that John Trasviña
told ICE officers in August of 2021 to no longer use the memo he had issued because of a 
recent federal court ruling on prosecutorial discretion. See Hamed Aleaziz, ICE Prosecutors
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the enforcement bureaucracy embraces the logic of priorities, the system will
invite arbitrary judgments.479 
Immigration law has resisted the development of internal administra-
tive law to guide and constrain agency ofcials, and full exploration of the 
reasons for the status quo merit further analysis. At least superficially, the 
government has powerful incentives for continuing to hold arbitrary 
power over millions of deportable immigrants.480 The President and the
immigration bureaucracy also potentially face political and reputational
costs of telling the public the truth that not every deportable immigrant
can, should, or will be deported.481 In the face of these obstacles, it is no 
wonder that scholars and advocates have looked to external constraints 
rather than internal administrative law. 
B. From Here to Proportionality
Once the immigration bureaucracy builds a foundation for reason 
giving, the public has a basis for assessing the quality of those reasons. At
this point, proportionality, which calls for a well-justified sanction, be-
comes possible. The plenary power doctrine notoriously gives Congress 
and the executive branch free rein over immigration policy,482 thereby lim-
iting the role of judicial review in immigration law. But structures to pro-
mote reason giving will ensure public scrutiny of government reasoning, 
even if not judicial scrutiny. This means that proportionality remains an
important, realizable normative ideal, despite doctrines limiting the role 
of the courts. 
Immigration Cases to Drop, BuzzFeed (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/hamedaleaziz/ice-prosecutors-biden-memo [https://perma.cc/XY28-6Q9G].
479. In addition, one might worry that increased transparency regarding shadow sanc-
tions ex ante might serve as a pull factor ex post, as many migrants will know they are un-
likely to be priorities for deportation. Empirical research on migration patterns, however,
undermines a clear link between programs of relief or forbearance and increased migration. 
When push factors are great, increased pull factors have little to no efect. See Push or Pull
Factors: What Drives Central American Migrants to the U.S.?, Nat’l Immigr. F. (July 23, 
2019), https://immigrationforum.org/article/push-or-pull-factors-what-drives-central-american
-migrants-to-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/P3TX-W42D] (concluding that “it is reasonable to
conclude that push factors—social, political, and economic realities forcing people to leave
their home countries—outweigh the pull factors in the U.S. that make it a more attractive
place to live”). 
480. See Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 111
(describing the empowerment of the executive branch by the operation of overbroad laws 
rendering a large population of people in violation and the executive’s power to choose 
who among that population to “investigate, arrest, and prosecute”). 
481. Cuéllar, supra note 196, at 63–64.
482. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889) (establishing Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration). But see Zadvydas
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The EU ofers an intriguing example of the role of reasoned admin-
istration in advancing proportionality in immigration law. As a general 
principle of EU law, proportionality “runs like a thread through” the EU 
Return Directive, which governs the expulsion of irregularly staying mi-
grants.483 The Return Directive obligates Member States to issue return de-
cisions to irregular migrants,484 but a return decision may be separate from 
a removal order.485 It may simply order voluntary departure. When imple-
menting the Return Directive, Member States must consider “the best in-
terests of the child, family life, and the state of health of the persons 
concerned, and respect the principle of non-refoulement.”486 Ultimately, 
this analysis encourages adjudicators to resolve cases using voluntary de-
parture over coercive removal when possible.487 
Although the Return Directive does not specify the procedures na-
tions must use in deciding to expel a migrant, EU law requires reasoned
administration. Specifically, the Court of Justice of the European Union
has ruled that general principles of EU law apply, namely, the right to a
hearing, which includes the noncitizen’s right to correct an error or sub-
mit information relevant to the decision.488 The government, in turn, must 
provide “a detailed statement of the reasons for its decision, which are 
specific, concrete, and understandable.”489 The Return Directive further 
requires Member States to provide irregular migrants with a “fair and 
transparent procedure for return decisions.”490 Decisions should be made
on a “case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, implying that con-
sideration should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay.”491 Commen-
tators have noted that boilerplate or “stereotyped reasons” violate the duty 
to give reasons.492 Instead, adjudicators must demonstrate that they con-
sidered the particular circumstances of the case. In this way, procedures of
reasoned administration facilitate consideration of interests relevant for 
proportionality analysis. 
483. Izabella Majcher & Tineke Strik, Legislating Without Evidence: The Recast of the
EU Return Directive, 23 Eur. J. Migration & L. 103, 105 (2021). 
484. Fabian Lutz, Termination of Illegal Stay, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law: A 
Commentary 685, 687 (Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym eds., 2d ed. 2016).
485. Id. at 699.
486. Steve Peers, 1 EU Justice and Home Afairs Law 506 (4th ed. 2016).
487. Id. at 502.
488. Id. at 508.
 489. Id. 
490. Migration and Home Afairs: Return & Readmission, Eur. Comm’n, https://ec.eu
ropa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/return-readmis 
sion_en/ [https://perma.cc/P9JL-V8VP] (last visited July 27, 2021). 
491. Council Directive 2008/115, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98, 98 (EC).
492. Sergo Mananashvili, Procedural Safeguards, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law: 
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EU human rights law contemplates even stronger protection of mi-
grants’ right to remain in the EU on the basis of proportionality.493 Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to
respect for family and private life.494 The European Court of Human 
Rights has ruled that this right encompasses the “totality of social ties be-
tween settled migrants and the community in which they are living.”495 To 
analyze deportation orders that implicate Article 8, the Court has devel-
oped a standard that requires the government to consider factors such as 
“[t]he nature and seriousness of the ofense, the duration of residence in 
the host country, the period of time that has passed since the ofense and 
the applicant’s conduct during that period, the nationalities of the various
persons concerned, and the applicant’s family situation.”496 This standard
advances proportionality because it “recognize[s] that a public authority 
should interfere in the least harmful way necessary to attain its objec-
tive.”497 It requires the government to assess each deportable immigrant
qualitatively, according to factors that might sound familiar to Ameri-
cans.498 Johan Rochel argues that this approach could also apply in admis-
sions, not merely removal, and powerfully illustrates the link between 
proportionality and procedure.499 Rochel argues that proportionality ap-
plies to immigrants’ procedural interests.500 Where a legal channel exists
for an application for admission, the immigrant is entitled to a reasoned 
decision.501 When the lens of proportionality is applied as well, immigrants
are entitled to more: an analysis of the “diferent interests at stake,” both
for the government and the applicant, as well as a justification supported 
by empirical considerations.502 In other words, they are entitled to a well-
justified decision. Rochel emphasizes data and evidence to ensure “the 
best possible quality of the administration of the law” and avoid arbitrary
493. Rochel, supra note 137, at 93 (“[P]roportionality has long been applied to the issue 
of deportation.”). 
494. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230. 
495. Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence 62 (2020), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DSL-EVXE].
496. Rochel, supra note 137, at 93.
 497. Id. 
498. See Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 60.
499. Rochel, supra note 137, at 99 (arguing that proportionality applies when the gov-
ernment ofers a procedure for considering a person’s interests, even in the absence of a 
legal right).
500. Id. at 98. In contrast, where immigrants lack a legal channel for migration, they
lack procedural interests that could be protected by proportionality. Id. at 99.
501. Id. at 101.
502. Id. at 104 (“Applied to the right to a reasoned decision, a proportionality assess-
ment would require the public authority to identify the relevant information to be delivered
in order to reach a sufcient threshold of quality in the justification. This task presupposes 
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decisions.503 Proportionality forces the government to analyze the applica-
tion of power in an individual case, based on specific facts.504 Using the 
example of an IT professional seeking an employment visa, Rochel illus-
trates the type of reasoning a public authority owes this worker under the 
joint principles of proportionality and reasoned administration.505 In such 
a case, the government should consider and disclose information about 
the number of current labor immigrants, current unemployment statistics,
and how specific economic sectors are faring.506 Boilerplate concerns for 
competition with EU workers will not do. Ultimately, Rochel describes pro-
portionality as a “lever to exercise a pressure towards better decisions . . . 
[that are] more comprehensive in the availability of the reasons justifying 
specific decisions and in the quality of these reasons.”507 
If true for Rochel’s IT professional seeking admission, the case is even 
clearer for deportable immigrants who typically have substantial ties to 
their country of residence. They should receive, at a minimum, a reasoned
account for a denial of a request for a sanction short of deportation.508 To
reflect the value of proportionality, the bureaucracy should go further and 
strive to provide well-documented, empirically supported decisions.509 The 
key implication for shadow sanctions in the United States is that, even in
the absence of a legal right to lenience, deportable noncitizens are enti-
tled, under proportionality, to a fair procedure—more than a cursory anal-
ysis of their interests and more than a conclusory decision. 
In other settings outside the realm of discretionary sanctions, federal 
courts have interpreted the APA to require the kind of robust, evidence-
based reasoning envisioned here. In United States v. Nova Scotia Food 
Products Corp., for example, a federal court held a regulation invalid when
503. See id. (noting that proportionality exerts pressure on public authorities “to go 
further than a [conclusory] justification mentioning legal sources and quickly summing up
the reasoning followed”).
504. See id. (“The objective is to challenge the justification presented by the public au-
thority on the quantity and quality of identified empirical considerations and delivered as
part of the decision.”). 
505. Id. at 98–100.
506. See id. at 105.
507. See id. at 104.
508. See id. at 101–03; see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2018) (establishing a right to an ex-
planation for a denial of a written application, petition, or other request in connection with 
an agency proceeding).
509. See Rochel, supra note 137, at 90 (“[P]roportionality should be drawn upon by
exercising normative pressure towards better documented decisions.”); id. at 106 (discuss-
ing how a government rejecting an employment visa due to, for example, the high domestic 
unemployment rate, should, pursuant to proportionality, identify specific data underlying
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the government failed to disclose evidence upon which it based its deci-
sion.510 Similarly, in Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, the court deemed
the EPA Administrator’s reasoning defective when the agency failed to 
timely disclose test results and procedures it used in devising its emission 
control rule.511 Transparency and evidence-based decisionmaking are core
aspects of reasoned administration. The APA ofers no textual hook for
proportionality, but the principle of proportionality resonates with long-
standing ideals of administrative law. 
C. Objections
Proportionality in administration requires the government to have a 
coherent sense of what makes a violation more or less severe. The judg-
ment as to the severity of an ofense will typically depend on the purposes 
of enforcement—what harms the rules at issue were designed to address. 
In many areas of administrative law, the nature of harms at issue are evi-
dent. For example, the EPA regulates entities in order to protect the public 
from pollution, promote the dissemination of accurate information about
environmental risks, review chemicals in the marketplace, and clean up 
contaminated lands.512 The SEC works to “protect[] investors, maintain[]
fair, orderly, and efcient markets, and facilitat[e] capital formation.”513 
Theoretically, at least, these agencies might arrive at a sense of the severity 
of a violation by referencing these goals. For example, a massive, ongoing
chemical spill is probably more serious than a company’s failure to obtain 
a license for some activity that would otherwise be permissible. 
Immigration law presents certain challenges by comparison, which
arise from a lack of clarity as to the harms that immigration law can be
thought to address. Congress created DHS in response to a specific 
event—the attacks of September 11, 2001—and the agency now operates
to “prevent future attacks . . . , respond[] decisively to natural and man-
made disasters, and advance[] American prosperity and economic security 
long into the future.”514 Thus, broadly, the purposes of immigration en-
forcement might include at least national security, public safety, and eco-
nomic welfare. 
510. See 568 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that the FDA’s failure to share evi-
dence motivating a food-safety regulation rendered it arbitrary and thus invalid).
511. See 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973). I thank Anya Bernstein for noting the rele-
vance of this case. 
512. See Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/ab
outepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/FHJ5-KCEL] (last updated July 2, 2021). 
513. What We Do, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo. 
html [https://perma.cc/2Q74-UXR5] (last updated Dec. 18, 2020).
514. Mission, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/mission [https:/ 
/perma.cc/8CDA-MT8Y] (last updated July 3, 2019).
 


























2021] IMMIGRATION LAW’S ARBITRARINESS PROBLEM 2115 
But if immigration enforcement has the goal of preventing or reme-
dying harm in these areas, that goal can and should shape the govern-
ment’s understanding of the “severity” of an immigration law violation, 
enabling the government to identify those ofenses meriting greater pen-
alties from those meriting lesser penalties. For example, it might seem that
a severe violation would involve some form of unlawful entry—a disregard 
of entry controls altogether.515 But as fixated as portions of the public are 
on noncitizens who have entered unlawfully, many are equally concerned 
about noncitizens, even lawful entrants, with some record in the criminal 
legal system, especially convictions for felonies.516 Thus, “severity” might
instead have something to do with a disregard for borders, but it might 
also sweep in considerations about the perceived harm to society of the 
noncitizen’s continued presence—lawful entry notwithstanding. 
An approach sensitive to harm would seek to prevent, remediate, or 
penalize purported harms resulting from unlawful entry or continued 
presence after violation of postentry conditions, such as those relating to 
public safety, national security, or economic welfare. Such an approach 
would also invite critique of the premise that deportable immigrants cause 
harm by their presence. On this harm-oriented conception, inquiry into
each deportable noncitizen’s conduct, situation, and equities becomes rele-
vant. This conception supports proportionality analysis because it recog-
nizes qualitative differences among immigration violations and noncitizens
themselves.
In contrast, some question the propriety of proportionality as a nor-
mative ideal for immigration enforcement. Some commentators view the 
purpose of the immigration system as protecting the nation’s sovereignty, 
with only secondary attention to the purported safety and economic harms
discussed above. Under this view, every border transgression and violation
of postentry controls violates the nation’s sovereignty and the right of citi-
zens to choose members of the polity.517 No metric exists for ranking
greater and lesser violations: They are all the same. This approach to con-
ceptualizing the purpose of enforcement shaped executive branch policy
515. See Meagan Flynn, An ‘Invasion of Illegal Aliens’: The Oldest Immigration Fear-
Mongering Metaphor in America, Wash. Post (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/nation/2018/11/02/an-invasion-illegal-aliens-oldest-immigration-fear-mongering-
metaphor-america/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (recounting the long history of
rhetoric about immigrant “invasions”).
516. See Angélica Cházaro, The End of Deportation, 67 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 35), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415707 [https://perma.cc/2M25-
3UFG] (noting widespread public support for deporting so-called “criminal aliens” (citing 
Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of 
Federalism, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 367, 372 (1999))).
517. Cf. Joseph H. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration 271 (2013) (characterizing the
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during the Trump Administration.518 Under this view of immigration law,
proportionality has no place. But such a view denies enforcement realities
and the inevitability of “policymaking through enforcement” in immigra-
tion law.519 
At the same time, scholars have critiqued the underpinnings of propor-
tionality from the other side of the ideological spectrum. Proportionality
requires drawing qualitative distinctions among deportable immigrants.
These scholars argue that sorting deportable immigrants based on fitness 
for deportation most often results in the vilification of immigrants with crim-
inal convictions.520 Given the racial biases rampant in the criminal legal sys-
tem, the automatic reliance on criminal arrests or convictions merely
perpetuates these biases.521 Elizabeth Keyes argues that relying on criminal 
convictions reifies a simplistic division between “good” immigrants and
“bad” ones.522 Angélica Cházaro critiques proportionality specifically as a 
misguided reform that assumes the inevitability of deportation and merely 
buttresses the premises of a violent system.523 Cházaro powerfully chal-
lenges basic assumptions of the current system by imagining immigration
518. See, e.g., Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks Discussing the Immigration
Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 7, 2018), https:/
/www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigratio
n-enforcement-actions/ [https://perma.cc/9QD2-5NN4] (“Immigrants should ask to apply 
lawfully before they enter our country. Citizens of other countries don’t get to violate our 
laws or rewrite them for us. People around the world have no right to demand entry in 
violation of our sovereignty.”).
519. Cf. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 5, at 196
(describing “policymaking through enforcement” and noting that “examples abound of
underenforcement motivated by policy and ideological judgments”).
520. See Cházaro, supra note 516, at 42 (“Accepting the deportation of people who may
present a risk of harm to others . . . requires accepting the idea that one can quantify ‘danger-
ousness’ in any sort of dependable way, when . . . controlling danger through crime has pri-
marily been a racialized project in the US.”); see also Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and
Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 207, 221 (2012) (noting how, even when attempting to combat anti-immigrant 
narratives, progressives fuel them by promulgating “good immigrant” narratives of hardwork-
ing, family-oriented immigrants who only take jobs no American would want anyway).
521. See Cházaro, supra note 516, at 38 (“The very instability of ‘crime’ has led to a rich 
and fruitful critique of how criminal enforcement is meted out, with scholars pointing to
how arrest, conviction, incarceration, and, by extension, deportation are distributed in race-
specific ways, rather than on the basis of conduct.”). 
522. See Keyes, supra note 520, at 211; see also Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Beyond Severity:
A New View of Crimmigration, 22 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 663, 705 (2018) (noting “rhetoric
revol[ving] around tropes of worthiness and blamelessness” with respect to noncitizen chil-
dren brought to the United States by their parents in violation of immigration law); Rebecca 
Sharpless, “Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and
Hyperincarceration, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 691, 707, 711 (2016) (“The respectable immigrant 
narrative deepens the link between crime control and immigration enforcement, reifies our
carceral state, and endorses extant societal inequalities that foster criminal activity.”).
523. Cházaro, supra note 516, at 36 (discussing literature decrying the racially biased
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law without deportation and destabilizing the concepts of “safety” and
“sovereignty.”524 But in the current nation-state system, one in which na-
tions establish laws that render some noncitizens deportable, the U.S. gov-
ernment will inevitably select some for deportation while shielding others. 
In such a system, proportionality has a role as a check on arbitrary govern-
ment power. The principle need not lead the government to valorize some 
immigrants and villainize others, but it does demand a link between immi-
gration enforcement and the purposes of the immigration system. 
CONCLUSION
This Article acknowledges the normative force of the ideal of propor-
tionality and argues for understanding it in terms of the justification of-
fered for a given penalty. Under this view, penalties are disproportionate
when they are poorly justified; the government’s reasons are insufciently 
“weighty.”525 Deportation strikes many as disproportionate for this very
reason: The government often lacks an adequate justification for 
uprooting and banishing a specific deportable immigrant based on the 
nature of the ofense or its implications for the purposes of the 
immigration system.526 As this Article observes, prevailing arguments for
proportionality have lost traction in recent years, as legislative reform 
remains unlikely, and the federal courts have rejected proportionality-
based arguments in immigration law.527 It turns out that immigration law
cannot realize proportionality without the federal bureaucracy.
Looking to the workings of the immigration bureaucracy reveals a
host of “shadow sanctions” about which the public knows next to nothing. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the government imposes one 
drastic sanction for every immigration violation, the reality is quite difer-
ent.528 But seldom does the government reveal data about shadow sanc-
tions or reasons for imposing them.529 Frequently, the government 
articulates no criteria at all. In this setting, the traditional safeguards
against the arbitrary exercise of government power are missing.530 Alt-
hough proportionality requires the government to ofer sufciently good 
reasons for a particular government action, the status quo of no reasons is
worlds away. Only by building the infrastructure for reasoned administra-
tion can immigration law one day realize proportionality. The first step is
addressing immigration law’s arbitrariness problem. 
524. See id. at 46–47.
525. See supra section I.B.
526. See supra section I.A.
527. See supra section I.A.
528. See supra section II.B.
529. See supra section II.C.
530. See supra section II.C.
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